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Hybrid Transactions and the
INTERNET of Things: Goods, Services,
or Software?
Stacy-Ann Elvy *
ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IOT) has been described by the American
Bar Association as “one of the fastest emerging,” potentially most
“transformative and disruptive technological developments” in
recent years. The security risks posed by the IOT are immense
and Article 2 of the UCC should play a central role in
determinations regarding liability for vulnerable IOT products.
However, the lack of explicit clarity in the UCC on how to
evaluate Article 2’s applicability to hybrid transactions that
involve the provision of goods, services, and software has led to
conflicting case law on this issue, which contradicts the UCC’s
stated goals of uniformity and simplicity. The Article contends
that the existing approaches used to evaluate whether Article 2
applies to a hybrid transaction are inadequate for assessing IOT
contracts and that IOT technology will increase the complexity
and frequency of existing hybrid transactions. Ultimately, the
Article proposes and evaluates four solutions for determining
whether Article 2 should apply to IOT transactions to provide
uniformity, simplicity, and clarity in this area. The Article
argues that a functionality approach is preferable as it effectively
considers the unique manner in which services and software are
provided in connection with the sale of IOT devices. Under the
functionality test, hybrid transactions involving goods, software,
and services are subject to Article 2 where the services and
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software advertised by the manufacturer and retailer are integral
to the device’s operations.
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I. Introduction
The uniformity of state laws has numerous benefits
including promoting predictability and stability, and the
elimination of extant legal principles in favor of more efficient
and adaptable rules. 1 With the goals of uniformity and
1. See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
International Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 746–52 (1999) (“A legal
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modernization in mind, Karl Llewellyn and others began
drafting the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 2 Today, the UCC
is the primary source of commercial law in the United States.
The code was created to reduce contrasting state approaches to
commercial law. 3 Thus, the UCC was intended to make uniform,
simplify, clarify and modernize state laws on commercial
transactions. 4
Article 2 of the UCC (Article 2) governs transactions in
goods. 5 However, despite the goals of certainty and uniformity,
one of the thorniest issues in sale of goods transactions is how
best to determine whether Article 2 applies to transactions
involving the provision of goods and non-goods, such as services
or software. 6 Courts have historically struggled to determine
whether Article 2 applies to these types of hybrid transactions

system that allows people to form clear legal commitments with predictable
consequences makes it easier for people to rely on each other . . . .”); see also
Benjamin Geva, Uniformity in Commercial Law: Is the UCC Exportable, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1996) (describing predictability and modernization of
laws as a byproduct of uniformity).
2. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 873, 876 (1939) (“[Judgements] in 1870 to 1900 . . . [are]
noncharacteristic . . . [and] do not afford guidance measurably transcending the
accident of judicial personnel.”); Geva, supra note 1, at 1039 (describing
modernization and uniformity as the goals of the drafters of the UCC).
3. See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Recent Developments in Commercial Law:
Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS L.J. 527, 530 (1980)
(describing the failure of previous uniform laws on commercial law, such as the
Uniform Sales Act, to achieve uniformity); Arthur L. Corbin, The Uniform
Commercial Code—Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 Yale L.J. 821, 834–35 (1950)
(“But after the 50 years through which we have just lived, the old rules need some
replacement, the old words need changing, the analysis and organization can be
improved, the remedies can be made more effective.”); U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (stating that the Uniform Commercial Code
should be construed liberally to promote its underlying purposes).
4. U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
5. Id. § 2-102.
6. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Applicability of the UCC to
Software Transactions; Technology Today, N.Y. L.J. ONLINE (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202484668508/Applicability-of-theUCC-to-Software-Transactions (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (acknowledging that
Article 2 does not explicitly mention software) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Law Review).
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and they continue to do so today. 7 Various approaches, such as
the predominant purpose test, have been offered by
commentators to address this lack of explicit clarity in Article
2. 8
Even within jurisdictions that have adopted the
predominant purpose test, courts often use different factors to
assess whether the predominant purpose of the transaction is
for the provision of goods or services. 9 As a result, there is a lack
of consensus on what transactions are subject to Article 2. 10 A
number of courts have applied Article 2 to transactions
involving software, while other courts have reached the opposite
conclusion. 11 In a 2016 district court case involving Article 2’s
role in a software transaction the court stated:
7. See id. (noting that courts continue to struggle with hybrid software
transactions that include custom development and the provision of services).
8. See J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So. 2d 396, 400
(Miss. 1996) (discussing courts that have reached different conclusions over
whether the UCC should apply to a mixed transaction of goods and services);
Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (Md. 1983) (“[T]he provisions of the
Maryland U.C.C. dealing with implied warranties apply to consumer goods, even
if the transaction is predominantly one for the rendering of consumer services.”);
see also 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-102:4
(2008) (“This stated limitation on the scope of Article 2 is not as absolute as it
seems. In some circumstances, both Article 2 and Article 9 will apply to the
transaction.”).
9. See infra Part III.A and accompanying notes 35–51 (discussing the rapid
expansion of IOT devices and the consequent security risks presented).
10. Scholars have also decried Article 2’s lack of uniformity on other
important issues, such as the extension of warranties to third party beneficiaries.
See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State
Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 343 (1978)
(illustrating the lack of uniformity from the issue of warranty and privity); see
also Jennifer Camero, Two Too Many: Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1, 12–21 (2012)
(“[S]ection 2-318 produces a lack of uniformity among the states that defeats the
UCC’s purpose, generates unpredictable seller liability, and creates unnecessary
disputes over applicable law.”).
11. See Olcott Int’l & Co. v. Micro Data Base Sys., Inc., 793 N.E. 2d 1063,
1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (applying Article 2 to contracts to purchase pre-existing
software modules); see also Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676
(3d Cir. 1991) (identifying the benefits of applying the UCC to computer software
transactions); Recursion Software, Inc. v. Interactive Intelligence, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 2d 756, 786 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (assuming the Texas UCC applies to software
licenses); Sagent Tech. Inc. v. Micro Sys., Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 464, 466 (D. Md.
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The applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to
software is a question that has confounded courts in the
digital age. For every court that finds that the weight of
authority favors application of common law and not the UCC
with regard to software licenses, another finds that courts
nationally have consistently classified the sale of a software
package as the sale of a good for UCC purposes. 12

Other complications arise in software transactions where
software is combined with hardware or where other products are
provided with the software. 13 Such agreements may be viewed
as hybrid transactions and evaluated under the predominant
purpose test. 14 Assuming that the software is viewed as a good
rather than a service, a hybrid transaction may also arise where
additional services, such as support services, are provided in
connection with the software. Even in cases in which software is
2003) (finding the UCC applies to the sale of computer software otherwise labeled
as licenses); Pearl Inv., LLC v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 352 (D.
Me. 2003) (“[T]he test for inclusion or exclusion from Article 2 [of the UCC] is not
whether the goods and non-goods parts of the contract are mixed, but rather,
whether their predominant factor . . . is a transaction of sale.”); I. Lan Sys., Inc.
v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (D. Mass. 2002) (“[T]he
UCC technically does not govern software licenses . . . but with respect to the
1999 transaction, the UCC best fulfills the parties’ reasonable expectations.”);
Wachter Mgmt. Co. v. Dexter & Chaney, Inc., 144 P.3d 747, 751 (Kan. 2006)
(finding that computer software is a good under Article 2 even where incidental
services are provided); Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492
N.E.2d. 314, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (declining to apply Article 2 where a
computer programming business only developed a processing system and did not
sell hardware).
12. SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., No. 5:10-25-FL, 2016 WL
3435196, at *10 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 2016).
13. See Arlington Electrical Constr. v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 1992 WL
43112, at *4–7 (stating that the sale of software and hardware in a single
agreement is a sale of goods and not services, but noting that the predominant
purpose test applies to determine whether the transaction is subject to Article 2);
see also Waterfront Props., Inc. v. Xerox Connect, Inc., 58 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(West) 809 (W.D.N.C. Jan 31, 2006) (applying Article 2 to a transaction involving
hardware and software); Keith A. Rowley et al., Uniform Commercial Code
Survey: Sales, 62 BUS. LAW. 1559, 1559–61 (2007) (discussing the Waterfront case
and other mixed transactions and contending that courts narrowly interpret the
scope of Article 2).
14. See Schroder’s, Inc. v. Hogan Sys., Inc., 741–42, 522 N.Y.S. 2d 404, 406
(1987) (describing the combination of hardware and software as a hybrid
agreement).
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provided without hardware, but is accompanied by development
or implementation services, courts are still faced with the
question of whether the transaction is governed by Article 2. 15
The lack of clarity in this area affects both consumer and
non-consumer transactions. 16 Rather than achieving uniformity
and simplicity, the UCC has “produced variety and [likely]
greater contracting risk” in certain areas. 17 The uncertainty on
this subject is glaring as the UCC, in contrast, provides specific
guidance on how to distinguish between a lease and a sale of
goods with a reserved security interest. 18
The impact of this ambiguity in Article 2 becomes more
pressing in the age of the Internet of Things (IOT). 19 Companies
15. See Wharton Mgmt. Grp. v. Sigma Consultants, 1990 WL 18360, at *7–
8 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1990) (finding that the services aspect of a transaction
for the design, development and installation of software, without the sale of
hardware, dominated the subject matter of the transaction, thereby removing the
transaction from the scope of Article 2).
16. See Howard Dodge & Sons, Inc. v. Finn, 391 N.E. 2d 638, 640 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1979) (describing the sale of air conditioning and heating equipment with
installation); see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Electro Flo Corp., 451 F.2d 1115,
1116 (10th Cir. 1971) (regarding the design and supply of aluminum floor
material); Holstad v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc. 421 N.W.2d 371, 372 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988) (discussing the purchase and installation of stock farm silo).
17. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Uniformity Norm in Commercial
Law: Optimal Institutional Design for Regulating Incomplete Contracts, in THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149, 193 n.2 (Jody S. Kraus
& Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (“[R]ecent scholarship criticizes the incorporation
strategy for interpretation as well.”).
18. See U.C.C. § 1-203(a)–(e) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001)
(“Whether a transaction in the form of a lease creates a lease or security interest
is determined by the facts of each case” and providing guidance on making such
determinations). There have been previous failed attempts to amend Article 2 to
clarify Article 2’s definition of goods. For instance, the 2003 withdrawn
amendments to Article 2 explicitly excluded information from the definition of
goods. See id. § 2-103(k) (specifying what the term “goods” includes and excludes).
19. The IOT is a network of connected devices which collect, store,
communicate, and transmit information to each other and associated systems.
See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of
the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 840 (2016) (contending that the
IOT will worsen preexisting information asymmetry in consumer contracts to the
benefit of companies, increase the lack of proximity between consumers and the
contract formation process, discourage understanding of contract terms, and that
common law agency principles, e-commerce statutes, and contract law are
unlikely to effectively address such concerns).
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are increasingly adopting a software and service centric
approach to the development and sale of goods. 20 Today,
consumers frequently purchase and easily integrate Internetenabled devices into their daily lives and activities. 21 IOT
devices can purchase goods without human intervention and
monitor consumption rates. 22 These products can also collect
and report to manufacturers and retailers status and location
data, as well as information about device users and individuals
in their households. 23 With the development of the IOT,
companies routinely offer services, goods, and software to buyers
in a single transaction. 24 For example, in connection with the
sale of an Indoor Nest Cam, Nest provides software updates and
offers a subscription service that sends motion alerts to
smartphones, saves past videos, in Nest’s cloud-based server,
and allows owners to rewind, share, and create time-lapses. 25
Almost any product including cars, everyday household and
office goods, and manufacturing equipment can be accompanied
by cloud or fog computing services, firmware, software updates,
and ongoing online services that facilitate interconnectivity
between individuals, companies, and systems. 26
20. See id. at 840 (“Today, merchants frequently use electronic shopping
agents in automated transactions to buy and sell goods.”).
21. See id. (explaining how IOT maximizes individual efficiency by
consolidating products, systems, and platforms into a single network).
22. See id. (“IOT robotic devices are revolutionizing the way that consumers
shop . . . . Consumers no longer need to log on to a company’s website or use a
mobile application to purchase goods.”).
23. See id. at 841 (“Digital tracking technology embedded within IOT devices
and smart labels could permit a manufacturer or retailer to advertise additional
products to consumers once a product is in the consumer’s home or office based
on the data generated by the device.”).
24. See id. (“[D]ata generated by IOT devices could be used to target
vulnerable consumers for contracting.”).
25. See What You Get with a Nest Aware Subscription for Your Camera, NEST
SUPPORT,
https://nest.com/support/article/What-do-I-get-with-Nest-Aware-forNest-Cam (last updated Sep. 9, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (providing a
comparison chart of the beneficial features attached to a Nest Aware subscription)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Every Nest Cam and Dropcam
comes with a free trial of Nest Aware, the subscription service, with video history.
See id. (allowing for a free trial lasting thirty days).
26. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 841 (“Goods can be made with a readable
element in the packaging, which will allow manufacturers to assess, in real time
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Consider that in 2016 the manufacturer of Revolv, a smart
home hub that allowed owners to control multiple devices in
their homes through a smartphone application, announced that
services would no longer be provided to support the device. 27
This rendered the device all but useless to buyers who purchased
the product, which retailed at $299. 28 Owners of the Revolv
device have not only spent funds to acquire the device but also
have incorporated the device into their daily lives and activities,
including allowing the device to potentially collect data about
their in-home activities. Now, suppose that the Revolv hub
device or a similar IOT device is vulnerable to hackers who could
access data collected by the device, 29 or remotely control the
the types of consumers who are buying and using their product.”).
27. See Alissa Walker, If You Use Revolv’s Smart Hub, You Are Officially
Screwed
(Thanks
Nest!),
GIZMODO
(Apr.
4,
2016,
5:45
PM),
http://gizmodo.com/nest-owned-smart-hub-gets-permanently-killed-1768977505
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (shutting down all support for the Revolv hub and its
smartphone apps to introduce an improved version) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Stephen Lawson, Why Nest’s Revolv Hubs Won’t be
the Last IOT Devices Knocked Offline, CIO (Apr. 4. 2016, 4:05 PM),
http://www.cio.com/article/3051188/internet-of-things/why-nests-revolv-hubswont-be-the-last-iot-devices-knocked-offline.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2017)
(“Devices that rely on cloud-based software are inherently vulnerable to getting
left behind if that software gets shut down, but IoT raises the stakes.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See Althea Chang, Nest to Disable Revolv Hub, Mulls Paying Back Users,
CNBC (Apr. 6, 2016, 2:04 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/04/06/nest-to-disablerevolv-hub-mulls-paying-back-users.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (working to
compensate customers who have been using the Revolv smart home system) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). While it has been suggested that
buyers may receive some compensation for the service cancellation, it is not
entirely clear whether any such compensation will adequately compensate
purchasers. See id. (“The company would not disclose exactly how Revolv users
would be compensated or whether their Revolv devices could be replaced by Nest
devices.”).
29. See Kat Greene, J&J Says Insulin Device Can Be Hacked But Risk is
Low, LAW360 (Oct. 4, 2016, 10:10 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/848402/jj-says-insulin-device-can-be-hacked-but-risk-is-low (last visited Mar. 5, 2017)
(recommending that users of OneTouch Ping insulin pump should take
precautions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Melissa
Daniels, St. Jude Heart Devices Have Security Weaknesses, Suit Says, LAW360
(Aug. 29, 2016, 5:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/833622/st-jude-heartdevices-have-security-weaknesses-suit-says (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (describing
security flaws in IOT pacemakers and the potential for hackers to tamper with
the device’s functions or the information collected by the device) (on file with the
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device. Should owners of such devices have a cause of action
under Article 2 where a manufacturer elects to terminate the
services and software updates that are integral to the device’s
operations or where a manufacturer’s database or a device is
hacked and a consumer’s data is leaked or the device
malfunctions as a result? This Article seeks to answer these
questions.
If a court were to determine that Article 2 does not apply to
a Revolv hub transaction, the common law would likely be
applicable to the dispute. Contracts that are subject to Article 2
typically obtain the benefit of various implied warranties
including the implied warranty of merchantability, unless such
warranties have been effectively disclaimed. 30 These warranties
can be particularly beneficial to buyers who were not provided
with an express warranty. IOT manufacturers may exclude the
services and software that they provide from the express
warranties that cover a device’s hardware. 31 The failure of an
IOT manufacturer to secure an IOT device or the data generated
by an owner’s use of an IOT device should serve as the basis for
breach of implied warranty claims under Article 2. 32 However,
such claims in the data breach scenario are more likely to be
viable where the transaction is subject to Article 2. 33

Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (“[A]
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”); id. § 2-314(3)
(“[O]ther implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.”).
31. See generally discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes.
32. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954–59 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (detailing how plaintiffs alleged that
defendant breached the implied Article 2 warranties and that by creating,
marketing, and selling PS3s and PSPs, the defendant represented and warranted
that its online services and networks were merchantable, fit for their intended
purposes, and provided adequate security for the plaintiffs’ personal information);
In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 613 F. Supp. 2d 108,
119 (2009) (detailing how the plaintiff asserted that the defendant breached the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose by failing to secure consumer
data and its electronic payment system, which was used by the plaintiffs to
purchase groceries from the defendant).
33. See generally discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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To avoid the application of Article 2, IOT companies may
separate the services and software from the sale of the device by
providing different agreements that govern the device’s
hardware, software and services. 34 A defendant may respond to
a suit involving a breach of warranty claim by arguing that
Article 2 does not apply to the transaction or that all warranties
have been effectively disclaimed. 35 In fact, a company facing a
data breach lawsuit may successfully defend against Article 2
breach of implied warranty claims by contending that the
services provided in connection with the device do not qualify as
a good under Article 2 and therefore the implied warranties are
not applicable. 36
There will be thirty-four billion IOT devices by 2020 and
nearly six trillion dollars will be spent on IOT solutions over the
34. See Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contracting Out of Article 2: Minimizing the
Obligation of Performance & Liability for Breach, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 401, 410–
11 (2007) (discussing the “predominant feature” test courts use to determine
whether to apply Article 2). End User Licensing Agreements may also be used in
hybrid software transactions to prevent application of the first sale doctrine under
copyright law. See 17 U.S.C § 109(a) (2006) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”); see also Lothar
Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don’t Judge a Sale by Its License: Software
Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European
Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 29, 35 (2002) (noting that courts disregard how
parties label the transaction by assuming there is a sale of goods when a software
copy is transferred perpetually against a lump sum payment). Companies may
also use End User Licensing Agreements to facilitate price discrimination, which
allows licensors to charge customers based on the prices that they are willing to
pay. As a result, large companies frequently pay more than smaller ones or
individuals, especially where pricing is based on the number of users or type of
use. See Jean Braucher, When Your Refrigerator Orders Groceries Online and
Your Car Dials 911 After an Accident: Do We Really Need New Law for the World
of Smart Goods?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 253–54 (2002) (noting that price
discrimination is legal when it is not accompanied by efforts to undermine
competitors).
35. See Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 436 (Md. 1983) (“Anthony
contends that the Sheehan’s swimming pool is not ‘goods,’ that exclusion of
implied warranties is allowed, and that a directed verdict on the plaintiffs’
warranty count was proper.”).
36. See Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (“Sony moves to
dismiss . . . the statutory claims fail because network services are not ‘goods’ as
defined under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).”).
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next five years. 37 As the American Bar Association has noted,
the rapid expansion of the IOT will require legal scholars,
companies, consumer protection advocates, regulators,
legislators, and lawyers to “identify and address potential risks
and liabilities.” 38 The security risks posed by IOT products are
immense as evidenced by a recent distributed denial of service
attack conducted by hackers who weaponized vulnerable IOT
devices to interrupt access to major websites. 39 These security
concerns may be due in part to the failure of IOT companies to
invest in building effective security measures into their devices.
The application of Article 2, along with its implied warranties to
transactions involving IOT products, may encourage IOT
companies to effectively address these security concerns.
Elsewhere, I have argued that the new, automatic, and
interface-free contracting environment generated by the IOT
creates difficulties in assessing consumer assent to contract
terms in a manner that compels a revision of applicable legal
rules. 40 My previous scholarship in this area acknowledged that
Article 2 may apply to certain IOT transactions. 41 However,
given the current lack of uniformity in dealing with hybrid
contracts, 42 it is unclear whether all IOT transactions will be
37. See John Greenough & Jonathan Camhi, Here Are IoT Trends That Will
Change the Way Businesses, Governments, and Consumers Interact with the
World, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2016, 10:18 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/top-internet-of-things-trends-2016-1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017)
(forecasting the emerging IoT market through megatrends, device growth, and
potential returns on investment) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
38. Internet of Things, INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT) NAT’L INST. (2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/science_technology/2016/iot
brochure.authcheckdam.pdf.
39. Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major Websites
Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/
business/internet-problems-attack.html?_r=0 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 839 (“This Article suggests important
amendment to Article 2 and argues that courts should adjust their application of
existing contract law and agency principles to account for the new automatic and
interface-free contracting environment that the age of the IOT will herald.”).
41. See id. at 859 (discussing the ability of the IOT device to consent to
agency, thus imposing contractual liability on the principal).
42. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 6 (“As evidence by several decisions
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subject to Article 2. This has important implications for the legal
framework which will govern disputes involving IOT products.
This Article builds on my previous work on the IOT by
evaluating the question of whether (and under what
circumstances) hybrid IOT transactions should be governed by
Article 2. 43
Ultimately, this Article contends that the existing
approaches currently employed to assess Article 2’s applicability
to hybrid contracts are wholly inadequate for IOT transactions.
Further, the widespread effective application of other legal
frameworks, such as the American Law Institute’s (ALI)
Principles on the Law of Software Contracts (Software
Principles) 44 to hybrid IOT transactions is questionable. IOT
technology will increase the complexity and frequency of
existing hybrid transactions, with ongoing relationships being
created between the buyer, the retailer and the manufacturer.
As will be shown below, this level of intricacy cannot be
effectively resolved under current approaches designed to deal
with hybrid transactions.
Consider a business that would like to sue a seller for breach
of warranties under Article 2 because of defective IOT
manufacturing equipment and services that negatively
impacted its production schedule and output. Assume further
that the IOT manufacturing device, which was built and
installed by the seller, contained embedded software and the
seller contracted to provide cloud-computing services and
in the past year, courts continue to wrestle with mixed software licensing
transactions that include custom development and the provision of services.”).
43. While scholars, such as Jean Braucher, have addressed hybrid
transactions involving software and goods in the non-IOT context, this Article
analyzes hybrid IOT transactions that involve not only the sale of goods and
software but also the provision of ongoing services, such as mobile applications,
and associated software updates and cloud computing, all of which are needed to
permit the devices to achieve full functionality. See Jean Braucher, Contracting
Out of Article 2 Using a “License” Label: A Strategy That Should Not Work for
Software Products, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 261, 262 (2006) (contending that software
product transactions, even if labeled “licenses” should be treated as sales for
purposes of applying Article 2).
44. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS
§§ 1.06(a), 2.02 (2010) [hereinafter Software Principles].
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software updates. Whether Article 2 would automatically apply
to such a contract is unsettled under current law. The lack of
clarity on the issue of whether Article 2 applies to hybrid
transactions belies the UCC’s stated goals of uniformity and
simplicity and can lead to unwarranted disputes between
parties about the laws applicable to a transaction. Parties
entering into such transactions are unable to definitively
determine whether Article 2 will apply to their hybrid
transaction before contracting. 45 While some vagueness in the
language of any uniform code can be expected, the provisions
related to the code’s scope should not be ambiguous.
In keeping with the stated goals of the UCC, this Article
offers four solutions to promote uniformity and clarity in this
area, but ultimately advocates for the adoption of a functionality
approach. Under each proposal, all parties involved in a hybrid
IOT transaction would know prior to contracting whether
Article 2 applies to the transaction. Further, courts would no
longer need to engage in the time consuming process of
attempting to apply vague tests or multiple and different factors
to determine Article 2’s applicability to such transactions. This
would also eliminate the conflicting holdings often found in case
law addressing hybrid transactions.
First, under a products approach, the scope of Article 2
would be expanded to explicitly cover transactions involving
“products,” which would include the sale of IOT devices, the
software built into these devices, software updates and all device
services offered by manufacturers or retailers, including product
ordering and monitoring services. Second, under a functionality
test, Article 2 would apply to a hybrid IOT transaction where
IOT devices are sold with ongoing services and software that are
necessary to enable the device to function as advertised. Thus,
if the IOT device cannot fully operate without the accompanying
45. While most consumers are likely unware of the UCC, legal counsel for
companies entering into IOT transactions may be particularly concerned about
the law that governs an agreement prior to contracting, as the applicable source
of law can impact a client’s rights and obligations under a contract. See Raysman
& Brown, supra note 6 (“[T]he application of the UCC to a software transaction
can be an important consideration that can radically change the remedies or
viability of the parties’ claims in a dispute.”).
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service and software provided by the manufacturer or retailer,
the transaction should be subject to Article 2. In the consumer
setting, buyers could be protected by non-disclaimable implied
warranties that apply to the device, and the ongoing services
and software that are needed for the device to function. 46 Third,
under an exclusionary approach, Article 2 would be revised to
exclude hybrid IOT transactions. Fourth, to resolve the
ambiguity in this area, Article 2 could be amended to adopt
Article 9’s embedded approach to the definition of goods. 47 The
Article concludes by suggesting that the adoption of a
functionality approach is preferable. The functionality test
accounts for the remarkable manner in which services and
software are provided in connection with the sale of IOT devices.
Part II of this Article contends that hybrid IOT transactions
are distinct from those entered into in the non-IOT setting, and
given the complexities of such hybrid IOT transactions, the IOT
will further exacerbate the problem of how to determine whether
Article 2 applies to hybrid transactions. Part III applies the
various existing approaches for evaluating Article 2’s
applicability to hybrid transactions to IOT hybrid contracts.
This section argues that the predominant purpose and the
gravamen of the claim tests are likely to be inadequate in the
IOT era. This section also considers other sources of law that
may be applicable to hybrid IOT transactions including the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Improvement Act
(Warranty Act) 48 and the Software Principles and highlights the
limitations of these frameworks. Part IV proposes four solutions
to resolve the hybrid transactions problem and addresses the
potential critiques of each of these solutions. The Article
ultimately calls for the adoption of a functionality approach.

46. See infra text accompanying note 124 (explaining how implied
warranties are default obligations that may entitle buyers to compensation).
47. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (a)(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010)
(defining goods to include embedded computer programs and any supporting
information).
48. Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 108(A), 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2301–2312).
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II. The Complexity of Hybrid IOT Transactions
IOT transactions frequently involve an intricate provision
of services, goods, and software that are in many instances
distinct from the hybrid transactions of the pre-IOT era. The
rapid expansion of the IOT and the complex nature of IOT
transactions suggests that new frameworks for evaluating
Article 2’s role in hybrid transactions are needed.
A. Mechanics of Hybrid IOT Transactions
Contracts for the sale of goods are frequently accompanied
by services. 49 In some instances, a retailer sells the goods to the
buyer, but an independent third party or the seller provides
installation services. 50 In other hybrid contracts, the seller
provides the goods and labor needed to create the final product.
For instance, the construction of a swimming pool involves the
provision of supplies as well as services and labor needed to
build the pool. 51
However, the IOT transforms the interactions between
buyers and sellers. The sale of a good can include not only a
standard installation service contract but also additional
continuous services and software—all of which are provided via
interconnected devices. 52 In the age of the IOT, companies are
49. See Appliances Services, BESTBUY.COM, http://www.bestbuy.com/site/
appliances-promotions/appliance-repair/pcmcat255100050002.c?id=pcmcat2551
00050002 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“We’ll install your new major appliance and
have it working when we leave.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
50. See Lisa Ryan, Home Depot Fends Off Delivery Driver Wage Action,
LAW360 (July 11, 2014, 6:29 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/556582/homedepot-fends-off-delivery-driver-wage-action (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (reporting
that Home Depot contracts delivery services through a third party) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
51. See DEP’T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, CONTRACTORS STATE LICENSE BOARD,
BEFORE YOU DIVE IN: A CONSUMER GUIDE TO SWIMMING POOL CONSTRUCTION
(2014),
http://www.cslb.ca.gov/Resources/GuidesAndPublications/BeforeSwim
mingPoolConstruction.pdf (indicating that a contract must include description of
the work and materials and equipment to be used).
52. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 841 (“These devices will be able to collect
location and consumption rate data, among other things, about the consumer on
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not only providing traditional installation services but they are
continuing to provide new types of services and software even
after the sale and installation of the device. 53 In this new setting,
sellers are supplying much more than the labor needed to
generate the final product.
Amazon’s Dash Button, which is linked to a specific product,
allows individuals to place orders automatically by clicking the
Internet enabled device. 54 The sale of an Amazon Dash Button
includes the purchase of the device and access to the
accompanying product replacement service from Amazon. 55
Consider a consumer or a business that has purchased a
Brother connected printer enabled with Amazon’s dash
replenishment service (DRS). Brother’s DRS terms and
conditions provide that buyers who elect to use its DRS enabled
printers are given a license to use its software. 56 Amazon
advertises DRS as a service that can be integrated into devices
and it allows these connected devices to measure a purchaser’s
rate of consumption as well as place successive orders for new

behalf of the manufacturer and retailer.”).
53. See id. (detailing how a Brita device can automatically order replacement
filters).
54. See Gordon Fletcher, Amazon Dash is a First Step Towards an Internet
of Things That Is Actually Useful, CONVERSATION (Apr. 8, 2015, 1:31 AM),
http://theconversation.com/amazon-dash-is-a-first-step-towards-an-internet-ofthings-that-is-actually-useful-39711 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (explaining how
household goods can be ordered by scanning barcodes or utilizing speech
recognition) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Brian
Benchoff, Inside the Amazon Dash Button, HACKADAY (May 12, 2015),
http://hackaday.com/2015/05/12/inside-the-amazon-dash-button (last visited
Mar. 5, 2017) (describing the different product versions of Dash Button available)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
55. See Amazon Offers Amazon Dash for $5 to Premium Customers, VENTURE
CAP. POST (July 30, 2015, 6:26 PM), http://www.vcpost.com/articles/
81696/20150730/amazon-offers-dash-5-premium-customers.htm (last visited
Mar. 5, 2017) (offering the dash button for sale to Amazon premium customers
for five dollars) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Brother User Terms, BROTHER-USA,
https://www.brother-usa.com/AmazonDash/terms.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2017)
(“Brother hereby grants you, free of charge, a non-exclusive and non-transferrable
license to activate the Software in your Products . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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goods. 57 Amazon provides buyers with a separate terms of use
for its DRS. 58 A buyer may have the ability to register or
deregister the IOT device with DRS. 59 What appears to simply
be the sale of a good—the printer—involves the provision of an
ongoing service for subsequent purchases of printer ink without
human intervention and a combination of software and
hardware that measures the amount of printer ink being used
by the purchaser, and collects and reports data about the device
and the purchaser to the manufacturer or retailer. Thus,
whenever a DRS enabled IOT device places an order for
consumable supplies, the owner of the device will be purchasing
goods while simultaneously using a product ordering service and
accompanying software. 60
Admittedly, the combination of hardware and software is
not a new development. 61 IOT devices are embedded with
high-velocity computer programs that are connected to

57. See id. (exchanging service-related information with makers of third
party
devices
used);
see
also
Conditions
of
Use,
AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/?nodeId=508088
(last
updated Jun. 21, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“When you use the Amazon
Software, you may also be using the services of one or more third parties, such as
a wireless carrier or a mobile platform provider.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). See generally Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use,
AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=20173
0770 (last updated Mar. 3, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 57 (“By using
Amazon Dash Replenishment, you agree to be bound by the terms of this
Agreement. If you do not accept the terms of this Agreement, then you may not
use Amazon Dash Replenishment.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
59. See id. (“LWA [Login With Amazon] allows customers to use their
Amazon account credentials to register for DRS.”).
60. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 841 (detailing digital tracking technology
embedded within IOT devices that permits automatic ordering).
61. See Jeff Nicholson, First Take: Amazon Dash Buttons. The Internet of
Things (IoT) takes a Big Step Forward, CUSTOMER THINK (Apr. 1, 2015),
http://customerthink.com/first-take-amazon-dash-buttons-the-internet-of-thingsiot-takes-a-big-step-forward/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“[T]he concept here is not
new . . . due credit must go to the renowned example of Red Tomato Pizza which
allowed . . . members to order a pizza with the click of a refrigerator magnet
button.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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traditional networks, cloud or fog computing. 62 This connection
increases the capabilities of IOT devices and makes them
significantly more powerful than traditional goods that contain
a basic combination of hardware and software. 63
In the IOT setting, software and related services, such as
mobile applications, play a central role in the operations of
goods, unlike earlier generations of goods. 64 In fact, IOT devices
are software-dominant products. 65 The unique combination of
hardware, software, and services allows IOT devices to transmit
data to a company about device errors, malfunctions, and the
purchaser’s rate of consumption, among other things. 66 It is
estimated that by 2018 IOT devices will “generate more than
400 zetabytes of data—or the rough equivalent of all the data
created from the dawn of the written word to the dawn of the
Internet.” 67
A buyer may purchase a product enabled with DRS from a
retailer other than Amazon. This retailer may then offer
installation services through an independent third party
company while Amazon provides its replacement services and
the product manufacturer provides software updates that allow
the device to function. 68 In such an instance, installation
services are being provided by a third party company or the
62. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 854 (“IOT robotic devices will be powered by
the Internet and will be able to share data between devices, cloud software, and
on-site infrastructure.”).
63. See id. (noting that IOT robotic devices will do more than simply enter
into transactions based on preexisting agreements, or make preprogrammed
choices).
64. See id. at 853 (“With the DRS, consumers ‘don’t have to do anything—
they can simply rely on the connected device to automatically reorder the
consumables to keep their homes running smoothly.’”).
65. See id. at 846 (“Approximately ninety percent of companies expect to
access and store data generated by IOT robots via cloud infrastructure and
software rather than through onsite infrastructure.”).
66. See id. at 841 (explaining how the readable element in the packaging is
transforming the marketing industry).
67. Terrell McSweeny, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks to the
Chamber of Commerce at TecNation: Meeting the Challenges of the Digital Age
(Sep. 20, 2016).
68. See Appliances Services, supra note 49 (indicating that delivery may be
performed by a third party company).
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initial retailer, but Amazon continues to provide an ongoing
service for the purchase and sale of new products. 69 Further,
complicating such transactions is the ability of independent
sellers to sell goods on Amazon directly to buyers. 70 The buyer
may also be granted a license to use the manufacturer’s
software. A buyer of an IOT device may be subject to three
separate contracts and potentially multiple sources of law:
(1) an end user licensing agreement (EULA) subject to
intellectual property law, the common-law or potentially the
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) for
the software that allows the IOT device to function; 71 (2) a
contract subject to Article 2 or the common-law, which is
provided by the manufacturer or retailer for the sale and
purchase of the IOT device—this contract may include a limited
warranty that covers the device but excludes software and
services—and (3) a licensing agreement for the use of the
company’s product ordering, monitoring, or other application
services. 72
One could view an IOT transaction involving goods, DRS,
and software as separate transactions: one in which a buyer
purchases the device from the manufacturer or retailer and
obtains a license to use the accompanying software from the
manufacturer, and another transaction in which a buyer
registers the device with Amazon to use DRS. However, the first
69. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 895 (“Manufacturers that embed Amazon’s
DRS into their products . . . could have unparalleled access to data about how
consumers use such products once the product is in a consumer’s home.”).
70. In such cases Amazon provides an A–Z Guarantee: “[W]e guarantee
purchases from third party sellers when payment is made via the Amazon.com
website or when buyers use Amazon Payments for qualified purchases on third
party websites. The condition of the item [purchased] and its timely delivery are
guaranteed under the Amazon A-to-Z Guarantee.” Help & Customer Service:
About A-to-z Guarantee, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=200783670 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
71. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change
and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240,
250 (2013) (suggesting that EULAs may be subject to UCITA).
72. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 57
(explaining that the use of third party Service Enabled Devices are subject to the
original Amazon sales agreement).
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transaction remains a hybrid transaction because it involves the
simultaneous provision of goods and software. 73 The second
transaction involves the use of software embedded within goods
and services. Even if the services and software are provided at
different times and by different parties, both are needed in order
for the device to achieve full functionality as advertised by the
manufacturer or retailer.
Where the manufacturer and retailer are the same entity,
and provide all of the services and software, it becomes more
difficult to contend that the transactions should be evaluated
separately. For instance, the purchase of an IOT thermostat
from Nest, which monitors users’ daily movements and adjusts
the temperature in a user’s home, includes not only the physical
device and accompanying software but also a monthly energy
report. 74 The report summarizes the heating and cooling usage
of buyers who own a Wi-Fi connected Nest Learning
Thermostat. 75 Nest provides various services that work together
with its IOT devices, such as a Nest user account website, mobile
applications and subscription services all of which allow users
to control and operate their devices. 76 Nest also supplies
purchasers with information about authorized third party
companies that offer standard installation services for Nest IOT
devices. 77 Nest provides three separate agreements that govern
73. See Braucher, supra note 34, at 246 (describing hybrid transactions as
non-sale transactions).
74. See Learn More About the Nest Home Report, NEST SUPPORT,
https://nest.com/support/article/About-the-Nest-Home-Report (last visited Mar.
5, 2017) (detailing the Nest Home Report that provides comparative usage data
and tips on how to save energy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
75. See Why Haven’t I Received My Nest Home Report?, NEST SUPPORT,
https://nest.com/support/article/Why-haven-t-I-received-my-Nest-Home-Report
(last updated Dec. 22, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (troubleshooting steps to
successfully receive Nest Home Reports) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
76. See Terms of Service, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/terms-of-service/ (last
updated Mar. 10, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (noting that some Nest products
and services can also be used in ways that integrate with third party products
and services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
77. See How Do I Arrange for Professional Installation Through My Nest
https://nest.com/uk/support/article/How-do-I-arrange-forRetailer?,
NEST,
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transactions involving their devices: (1) an EULA for the
software provided in connection with their devices, 78 (2) terms
and conditions that apply to the sale of the device, 79 and (3) a
service agreement that governs accompanying services. 80
Viewing a hybrid IOT transaction as involving separate and
distinct contracts for goods, services, and software is highly
problematic where a manufacturer elects to terminate the
services that support the device’s operations. Unless companies
elect to provide adequate compensation to buyers when they
terminate services for IOT devices, buyers may be left with IOT
devices that simply do not function. The service agreement may
also provide buyers with no recourse where service is
interrupted or suspended, which could render the device useless
during that period. As the IOT evolves, the services provided by
companies in support of IOT devices may become even more
critical to the functioning and performance of the device, but
such services are not typically covered by warranties. If the
services and software provided in connection with the sale of a
device are central to the operations of the device and those
services are terminated or interrupted, Article 2 should govern
the resulting dispute.
B. Distinctions Between IOT and Other Hybrid Transactions
IOT hybrid agreements are unlike other hybrid transactions
in several ways. First, these transactions are different from the
standard service contracts consumers or businesses may
purchase in connection with the sale of goods. Business and
home service contracts are typically warranty contracts that
professional-installation-through-my-Nest-retailer (last visited Mar. 5, 2017)
(explaining the various installation options available from Nest retailers) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. End User License Agreement, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/eula/ (last
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
79. Sales Terms, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/sales-terms/ (last visited Mar.
5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Limited Warranty
Thermostat, Nest, https://nest.com/legal/warranty/thermostat/ (last visited Mar.
5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
80. Terms of Service, supra note 76.
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extend the life of existing warranties or obligate a company to
repair or replace defective parts. 81 However, IOT services, such
as DRS, are not currently offered to protect buyers in the event
the device malfunctions. Rather, IOT services, software and
devices work together to measure consumption rates, collect,
and transmit data about owners to companies, automatically
order goods, and allow owners to remotely control multiple
devices, among other things. 82 Of course, standard service
contracts that provide guarantees for defective parts may also
be offered by companies in connection with the provision of IOT
devices. This would increase the types of services being offered
in an IOT transaction. Such a transaction would involve both
new IOT services, such as product ordering and mobile
application services, as well as a standard service contract.
Additionally, companies may ultimately expand and create new
types of services that are provided through IOT devices.
While companies have used ordering and subscription
services for years to increase sales, 83 IOT services are distinct
81. Some states may also regulate the provision of certain service contracts
via the adoption of the Model Services Contract Act of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners. See SERV. CONTRACTS MODEL ACT (NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM’RS 1997), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-685.pdf (providing a model
statute for the regulation of service contracts); see also ALA. CODE §§ 8-32-1 to -12.
(2016) (creating a framework to regulate service contracts); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 201095 to -1095.10 (2016) (regulating contracts offered by service companies); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-114-101 to -112, 4-90-501 to -512 (2016) (creating a framework for
regulating service contracts and offering consumer protections); CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 9855 to 9855.9, 12800–12816, 12740–12767 (2016) (concerning
motor vehicle and residential insurance); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 481X-1 to -12 (2016)
(regulating service contracts); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-114A, 49-2801 to -3715 (2016)
(concerning motor vehicle insurance); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 152/1 to 152/99 (2016)
(regulating service contracts); IOWA CODE §§ 523C.1–.25, 516E.1–.21 (2016)
(relating to residential and motor vehicle insurance, respectively).
82. See Get Started With Dash Replenishment, https://developer.
amazon.com/dash-replenishment-service/getting-started, AMAZON DEVELOPER
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (providing an overview of DRS services and functions)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
83. See Michael Lev-Ram, It’s a Subscription Economy and You’re Just
Living in It, FORTUNE (June 6, 2014, 6:42 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/06/
welcome-to-the-subscription-economy (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“It’s actually not
that new: Businesses have been selling monthly subscriptions for all sorts of goods
and services for years—magazines like Fortune come to mind.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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from these types of service options, which have previously
accompanied the sale of goods. Historically, a buyer was able to
enter into a contract for the sale of a static device, such as a
thermostat, via a subscription or ordering service—but the
usefulness of such a thermostat to the buyer did not depend on
the subscription service provided by the company. 84 The
functionality of the thermostat was not connected to, and did not
rely, on the ordering or subscription service. 85 In contrast, in the
IOT setting, buyers likely choose to purchase IOT devices, such
as a Nest Learning Thermostat or a Brother DRS printer, over
a non-IOT printer or thermostat, because of the smart home
capabilities of the IOT version of these goods, and the services
advertised by companies as being necessary for the buyer to
enjoy the full array of benefits provided by these IOT devices. 86
A buyer may purchase a Nest Learning Thermostat because of
the useful energy reports and the ability to control the device
using the company’s mobile application. 87 A buyer may elect to
purchase a DRS-enabled washer because the device will be able
to dispense the amount of detergent needed to do a load of
laundry, measure consumable usage, and automatically place
subsequent orders for detergent using the accompanying
service. 88 Subscription and product ordering services are no
84. See Internet of Things: Science Fiction or Business Fact?, 2014 HARV. BUS. REV.
1, 3 (Sept. 2014), http://hbr.org/resources/pdfs/comm/verizon/ 18980_HBR_Verizon_
IoT_Nov_14.pdf (providing an overview of the Internet of Things and noting potential
challenges inherent to shifting from a products-based business to a service-based or
hybrid business).
85. Id.
86. See Works With Nest, NEST, https://nest.com/works-with-nest (last
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (demonstrating the interdependency of Nest products and
services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
CONNECT.PRINT.SHARE., BROTHER, http://www.brother-usa.com/connect/
mobile (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (demonstrating the interdependency of Brother
products and services) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
87. See Nest App, NEST, https://nest.com/app (last visited Mar. 5, 2017)
(advertising the features available through use of Nest’s mobile application) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
88. See First Amazon Dash Replenishment Devices Now Available, BUS.
WIRE (Jan. 19, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/
home/20160119005749/en/Amazon-Dash-Replenishment-Devices (last visited
Mar. 5, 2017) (“GE’s washer with Smart Dispense technology stores detergent and
automatically dispenses the right amount for each load so customers don’t have
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longer stand alone items or offers but are very much connected
to, and supplied directly through IOT devices. 89
Consider that the defining feature of an IOT sex toy
manufactured by Standard Innovation Corporation is a mobile
application that allows owners of the smart device to control the
device “from near or far, letting a user change vibration modes
from their phone or allow a far-flung partner to take the
reins . . . .” 90 Similarly, the valuable video feeds and clips
generated by a Nest Cam are only available via Nest’s mobile
application and website. 91 While security cameras and video
feeds are not new, IOT security cameras permit owners to
remotely view security feeds and control the devices through a
mobile application or a website without a physical video
system. 92 While not all IOT devices can be accessed and
controlled by a mobile application, the range of operations of an
IOT device is very much dependent on the services and software
provided by companies.
The failure of IOT manufacturers to properly maintain and
monitor a device and the accompanying software and services
may have dire consequences for consumers. For example, a
smart Dexcom glucose monitoring device that allows owners to
continuously and remotely track and share glucose levels, failed
to alert a consumer of his low blood sugar levels, which resulted

to worry about it. With Dash Replenishment, customers use the associated app to
set their preferred preorder level and Amazon delivers detergent when supply is
running low.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
89. See supra Part II.A (discussing DRS devices and services).
90. Shayna Possess, Vibrator Gets Too Intimate by Tracking Usage Infos,
Suit Says, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2016, 3:57 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
840299/vibrator-gets-too-intimate-by-tracking-usage-info-suit-says (last visited
Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
91. See FAQs About Moving From the Dropcam App to the Nest App, NEST,
https://www.nest.com/support/article/FAQs-about-moving-from-the-Dropcamapp-to-the-Nest-app (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (answering general questions
consumers may have concerning the Nest application’s functionality) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
92. See Megan Wollerton, Nest Cam Outdoor Review, CNET (Sept. 15, 2016),
https://www.cnet.com/products/nest-cam-outdoor/review (reviewing the function
and features of Nest’s outdoor camera) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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in a car crash after the consumer lost consciousness while
driving. 93
Unlike many software hybrid transactions that involve the
creation of software programs tailored to the needs of a buyer,
in many consumer IOT hybrid transactions a buyer purchases
devices that are embedded with pre-existing standardized
software and accompanied by software updates. 94 Of course, the
monetization of software in the IOT setting could result in
consumers working with IOT companies to customize their IOT
devices. Additionally, a scenario could easily be envisioned
where a company purchases an IOT manufacturing device and
requires the seller to customize the accompanying software,
hardware, and services to suit the company’s needs.
Given the frequency with which devices and servers are
hacked, 95 the software contained in many IOT devices will likely
become vulnerable to intrusion over time, requiring IOT
manufacturers to offer software and security upgrades
throughout the life of the device. For instance, in 2016, hackers
exposed serious vulnerabilities in Tesla’s Model S sedan which
allowed them to remotely open car trunks, manipulate car
brakes and adjust the seating. 96 Nest software updates allow
93. See Emily Field, Blood Sugar Monitor Maker Hit with Suit Over Car
Crash, LAW360 (Aug. 31, 2016, 4:59 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/834866/blood-sugar-monitor-maker-hit-with-suit-over-car-crash
(last
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (detailing the factual background of the consumer’s legal
action against Dexcom) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
Federal Drug Administration had previously taken steps to attempt to address
consumer concerns with Dexcom’s devices. Id.
94. For example, Nest’s outdoor camera and accompanying app provide cloud
storage for up to three hours of video content. See Wollerton, supra note 92
(explaining the capabilities of the Nest system).
95. See David Maman, Database Hacking: The Year That Was, HELP NET
SEC. (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2012/12/31/databasehacking-the-year-that-was (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“Database breaches happen
every day—internally, from dishonest employees and subcontractors, to external
sources such as hackers using SQL injections, worms infecting public web sites,
massive phishing attacks, and targeted attacks on financial institutions and
defense organizations.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
96. See Rob Price, Car Hackers Found a Way to Trigger a Tesla’s Brakes from
Miles away, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/carhackers-trigger-tesla-model-s-brakes-unlock-doors-adjust-seats-tencent-keensecurity-lab-2016-9 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (explaining how car hackers were
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Nest to send messages to an owner’s phone when temperature
fluctuations may lead to frozen pipes. 97 Owners of Nest Protect
can view smoke and carbon monoxide alarms on the Nest
Learning Thermostat and multiple Nest thermostats now have
the capacity to work together to save energy as a result of recent
software updates. 98 The recently launched Nest Cam Outdoor
provides notifications to an owner’s smartphone when it detects
suspicious activity, records the event, and sends the video
directly to a Nest cloud-based server. 99
Although IOT devices may receive software updates from
manufacturers in the same way that a buyer may obtain
software updates in connection with the sale of a computer, 100
IOT devices—unlike these traditional products—have the
capacity to independently track consumption rates and order
goods via the ongoing services provided by a manufacturer or
third party company. 101 A computer may continue to function
able to override the Tesla’s autopilot system) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). In response, Tesla rolled out a security patch to fix the problem.
See id. (explaining Tesla’s response to rectify this serious error).
97. See Kellex, Nest Introduces New Protect and Cam, Updates Software for
Thermostat and Apps, DROID LIFE (June 17, 2015), http://www.droidlife.com/2015/06/17/nest-introduces-new-protect-and-cam-updates-software-forthermostat-and-apps (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“The best-selling Nest Learning
Thermostat is getting even better, now notifying customers when temperatures
drop to help avoid frozen pipes and adding new integrations with other Nest
products.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. Id.
99. See Horia Ungureanu, Nest Finally Launches an Outdoor Security
Camera: Meet The $199 Nest Cam Outdoor, On Preorder Now, TECH TIMES (July
14, 2016, 10:41 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/169880/20160714/nestfinally-launches-an-outdoor-security-camera-meet-the-199-nest-cam-outdoor-onpreorder-now-video.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (detailing the features and
functions of Nest’s outdoor security camera) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
100. For example, Microsoft’s Windows 10 operating system automatically
delivers software updates to personal computers. See Sarah Jacobsson Purewal,
Stop Windows 10 From Automatically Updating Your PC, CNET (May 18, 2016,
12:20 PM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/stop-windows-10-from-automaticallyupdating-your-pc (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“Windows 10 automatically checks
for, downloads and installs new updates to your PC—whether you like it or not.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
101. For instance, Amazon’s DRS utilizes these IOT device features to take
shipping orders automatically. See Get Started with Dash Replenishment,
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with the software that was pre-installed by the company upon
purchase, and a buyer does not always need to rely on software
updates or services from the manufacturer or retailer. 102 In
contrast, the functionality of IOT devices depends significantly
on the services and software provided by manufacturers and
retailers. In some instances, buyers are required to consent to
automatic software updates to their Wi-Fi connected IOT
devices. 103 If a purchaser objects to their IOT device receiving
software updates, their only remedy is to stop using the
device. 104
While there may be some similarities between traditional
hybrid transactions involving the sale of goods, software, and
services, IOT hybrid transactions involve a multifarious array
of new and ongoing services and software that may be provided
by multiple parties. The new types of services and software that
are expected to be provided in IOT transactions, along with the
possibility that companies may continue to provide standard
services, including installation services, will generate even more
elaborate hybrid transactions. 105 This increased level of
complexity provides a strong justification for the development of
new approaches in this area.

AMAZON DEVELOPER, https://developer.amazon.com/dash-replenishment-service/
getting-started (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (providing an overview of the Dash
Replenishment Service) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
102. See Tim Fisher, Windows Updates and Patch Tuesday FAQ, LIVEWIRE,
https://www.lifewire.com/windows-updates-patch-tuesday-faq-2625777
(last
updated Apr. 1, 2016) (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (noting that software updates
are not necessary for Windows to function) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
103. See, e.g., End User License Agreement, supra note 78 (noting that by
using Nest devices a buyer consents automatically to software updates).
104. See Terms of Service, supra note 76 (“You consent to this automatic
update. If you do not want such Updates, your remedy is to terminate your
Account and stop using the Services and the Product.”).
105. Some tech and marketing consultants have already taken notice of IOT’s
potential, especially in private residences. See, e.g., Joe Fletcher, Bundling
Services in IoT (Part II), MEDIUM (July 27, 2016), https://medium.com
/@joefletcher/bundling-services-in-iot-part-ii-40f4ab92419c#.jb1hdv93f
(last
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (calling for third party companies to offer hybrid deals) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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III. The Inadequacy of Current Approaches in the IOT Era
Article 2’s applicability to transactions involving goods and
non-goods has long been a vexing problem. This section
highlights the inadequacies of the different approaches offered
to address the hybrid transactions problem and evaluates the
potential role of common-law warranties, the Warranty Act,
UCITA, and the Software Principles in ameliorating the
concerns raised by such transactions. Common-law warranties
are unlikely to be widely applied to IOT transactions and while
the Warranty Act has promise, its ability to protect consumers
has been limited in a number of areas. The Software Principles
suffer from several limitations, some of which are similar to the
deficiencies found in the current approaches used to address
hybrid transactions. UCITA has not been widely accepted by
states.
A. Services and Goods under Article 2
To encourage the adoption of a uniform law on commercial
transactions, Karl Llewellyn contended in 1939 that American
sales law was inadequate for the industrial economy. 106 Today,
we have transitioned from the industrial era to an information,
service and sharing economy. 107 The IOT is expected to
revolutionize the information economy. 108 Article 2 and its
definition of goods were adopted to address transactions where
the sale of movable goods was the essence of the transaction.
Section 2-102 of the UCC provides that Article 2 applies to
106. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 2, at 876.
107. See Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software
Transactions, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 459, 461 (2000) (“We are undergoing another
change today . . . . It is the transition from an industrial to an information
economy.”).
108. See Susan Fourtané, IoT Revolution: Is the Enterprise Ready?, INFO. WK.
(Mar. 27, 2015, 8:05 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/strategic-cio/itstrategy/iot-revolution-is-the-enterprise-ready/a/d-id/1319636 (last visited Mar.
5, 2017) (“There is little doubt the Internet of Things revolution is coming, and it
will fundamentally change the way people interact with different devices.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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transactions in goods. 109 Subject to a few exceptions, goods are
defined as all things moveable at the time of identification to the
contract. 110 The predominant purpose and the gravamen of the
claim tests have been offered by commentators as effective
solutions for evaluating Article 2’s applicability to transactions
involving the sale of goods and services. 111 This Subpart will
explain each of these tests and apply them to IOT transactions
and argues that these tests are insufficient for the IOT era.
1. Predominant Purpose Test
To evaluate whether Article 2 applies to a hybrid
transaction, most jurisdictions have adopted the predominant
purpose test. 112 Courts assess whether the predominant purpose
of the transaction is for the provision of goods or services. 113
Article 2 will apply only where the transaction is predominantly
for the provision of goods. 114 If the service aspect of the contract
predominates then the warranties of quality under Article 2 are
likely not applicable. 115
109. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
110. Id. § 2-105.
111. This Article explores the courts’ use of the predominant purpose test in
the following subsection. Infra Part III.A.1. The article will subsequently discuss
use of the gravamen of the claim test. Infra Part III.A.2.
112. See Abby J. Hardwick, Note, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code:
How Will a Change in Scope Alter the Concept of Goods?, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 275,
280 (2004) (“The test most commonly used by the courts was the predominant
purpose test.”); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.9,
at 44 (3d ed. 2004) (“Courts usually determine whether a transaction is one in
goods, services, or land by looking for the ‘predominant factor’ of the contract.”).
113. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (“The test for
inclusion or exclusion [in the U.C.C.] is not whether they are mixed, but, granting
that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their
purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally
involved . . . .”).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 958 (“[U.C.C. § 2-102] is divided into two parts, the first
affirmative, defining the scope and reach of Article 2, the second negative,
excluding certain transactions. To come within the affirmative section, the
articles must be movable, and the movability must occur at the time of
identification to the contract.”).
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Courts often use different factors to assess whether the
predominant purpose of the transaction is for the sale of goods
or services. For instance, in Colorado Carpet Installation, Inc. v.
Palermo, 116 the court held that in evaluating the circumstances
surrounding the contract and its performance, the following
factors should be used: the contract language; whether the
contract provides an overall price or separate prices for goods
and labor; the ratio of the costs of the goods to the total contract
price; and the nature and reasonableness of the purchaser’s
contractual expectations of acquiring a property interest in the
goods. 117
A Delaware court noted that the factual circumstances
surrounding the negotiation, formation, and contemplated
performance of the contract should be considered; however, “if
the cause of action centers exclusively on the materials portion or
the services portion of the contract, the determination may rest
upon that fact.” 118 In applying the predominant purpose test, the
116. 668 P.2d 1384 (Colo. 1983).
117. See id. at 1388–89 (listing factors used to apply the predominant purpose
test); see also Stafford v. Int’l Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1981)
(“[T]he underlying nature of a hybrid transaction is determined by reference to
the purpose with which the customer contracted with the defendant . . . .”);
Neibarger v. Universal Coops., Inc., 486 N.W.2d 612, 622 (Mich. 1992) (“If the
purchaser’s ultimate goal is to acquire a product, the contract should be
considered a transaction in goods . . . . Conversely, if the purchaser’s ultimate
goal is to procure a service, the contract is not governed by the UCC, even though
goods are incidentally required in the provision of this service.”). This focus on the
purchaser’s intent presumes that the services and goods can be easily separated
and that the service does not impact functionality of the goods. This becomes
problematic in the IOT setting where the operations of the device are dependent
on the service and software provided by the manufacturer or retailer and the
services are no longer incidental to the device. Additionally, in some instances,
courts have also evaluated whether the final product produced in a hybrid
transaction is movable, thereby, meeting the definition of goods under Article 2.
See generally Meyers v. Henderson Constr. Co. 370 A.2d 547 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977) (finding that the predominant purpose of the transaction was for the
provision of prefabricated but disassembled doors); Lake Wales Publ’g Co. v.
Florida Visitor Inc., 335 So. 2d 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that the
production of printed pamphlets were goods subject to the UCC). The
functionality approach advocated for in Part IV.B of this Article evaluates much
more than whether the finished product sold to a buyer is movable. Infra Part
IV.B. The functionality approach also addresses the extent to which ongoing
services and software are needed for the product to function.
118. See Glover Sch. & Office Equip. Co. v. Dave Hall, Inc., 372 A.2d 221, 223
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Fourth Circuit has considered the nature of a supplier’s business
in addition to the contract language and the value of the
materials. 119 Moreover, even when courts identify the specific
factors to be considered when applying the predominant purpose
test, courts rarely provide a clear analysis that applies the
factors to the facts of the case. 120 Instead, courts often simply
“state the facts and then declare an answer.” 121 Application of
the predominant purpose test requires courts to engage in a
retrospective analysis regarding the predominating purpose of a
hybrid transaction. 122
Given the various factors used by courts in applying the
predominant purpose test it is not surprising that different
courts applying this test to similar facts have reached opposite
conclusions. 123 For instance, disputes involving the sale and
installation of swimming pools, flooring, alarm systems, and air
conditioning have led to conflicting case law. 124 In Baker v.
(Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (examining the nature of a transaction to supply and install
schoolhouse equipment and noting that the price of the goods in comparison to
the services may also be relevant).
119. See Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456,
460 (4th Cir. 1983) (“They emphasize, in particular, three aspects which may, or
may not, constitute indicia of the nature of the contract: (1) the language of the
contract, (2) the nature of the business of the supplier, and (3) the intrinsic worth
of the materials involved.”).
120. See LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, COMMERCIAL LAW:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SALES AND PAYMENTS 24 (2012) (discussing
application of the predominant purpose test).
121. Id.
122. See Laura McNeill Hutcheson, The Exclusion of Embedded Software and
Merely Incidental Information from the Scope of Article 2B: Proposals for New
Language Based on Policy and Interpretation, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 977, 978
n.8 (1998) (discussing an amendment to the U.C.C. which would address software
licensing and electronic contracts).
123. HAWKLAND, supra note 8, § 2-102 (noting that “the application of the
predominate purpose test is inherently a factual inquiry where similar
circumstances can result in divergent decisions. For example, using the
predominate purpose test, courts sometimes conclude that a building contract is
governed by Article 2, and other courts conclude that Article 2 does not apply.”).
124. See generally NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE CONSUMER CREDIT AND
SALES LEGAL PRACTICE SERIES: SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES 161 (2d ed. 1989);
Jesse M. Brush, Mixed Contracts and the UCC: A Proposal for Uniform Penalty
Default to Protect Consumers 11–13 (Student Scholarship Papers, Working Paper
No. 47, 2007) (on file with author). Compare Riffe v. Black, 548 S.W.2d 175, 176–

108

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2017)

Compton, 125 the court found that Article 2 applied to a contract
for the sale and installation of furnaces, air conditioners, and
water heaters in a building as the equipment represented a
majority of the purchase price and the services were incidental
to the sale of the goods. 126 In contrast, in Mingledorff’s, Inc., v.
Hicks, 127 the court determined that a contract for the sale and
installation of heating and air conditioning systems in an
apartment complex was not subject to Article 2 as the equipment
and material furnished were incidental to the contract. 128
The Fourth Circuit has acknowledged that there is a “welter
of [hybrid transactions] cases reaching varying results
depending on the considerations deemed to predominate in each
particular case.” 129 The predominant purpose test along with the
various factors used by courts applying this test has created a
lack of uniformity and clarity in decisions addressing the
applicability of Article 2 to hybrid transactions, which
contradicts the stated goals of the UCC. 130
78 (Ky. 1977) (affirming the trial court’s finding that implied warranties existed
in the sale and installation of a swimming pool), with Gulash v. Stylarama, 364
A.2d 1221, 1223–24 (Conn. C.P. 1975) (finding that a contract to sell and install
an aboveground swimming pool was not a sale of goods). In Aluminum Co. of Am.
v. Electro Flo Corp., which involved the design and production of flooring
material, the Tenth Circuit held that Article 2 and an implied warranty applied
to the transaction. 451 F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1971). In contrast, in Ranger
Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., the South Carolina federal district court held that
a contract for the installation and sale of flooring was not subject to Article 2. 433
F. Supp. 442 (D.S.C. 1977).
125. 455 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
126. Id. at 385–86; see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Electro Flo Corp., 451
F.2d 1115, 1118 (10th Cir. 1971) (“We hold that the transaction between Alcoa
and Electro Flo, while it involve some engineering and design aspects, was in
essence a sale of goods.”).
127. 209 S.E.2d 661 (1974).
128. Id. at 662; see also Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., Inc., 433 F.
Supp. 442, 445 (D.S.C. 1977) (“[I]t is only logical to conclude that the contract in
dispute in this case is . . . a contract for the performance of services with the sale
of the goods necessary to perform those services being incidental to the service
contract. Therefore, the [U.C.C.] would not be applicable in this case.”).
129. Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 706 F.2d 456, 460
(4th Cir. 1983).
130. One of the UCC’s stated goals is “to simplify, clarify, and modernize the
law governing commercial transactions.” U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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Application of the predominant purpose test to IOT
transactions may also lead to ambiguous or conflicting results.
For example, consider a contract for the purchase of a Brother
printer enabled with DRS. Is such a contract predominantly for
the purchase of the printer? One could argue that a consumer or
a business purchases a printer in order to use the product and
DRS is incidental to such a transaction. However, DRS permits
the printer to automatically reorder printer ink, which is also
instrumental to the functioning of the printer. Of course, a buyer
may ultimately elect not to use DRS to order printer ink, but a
buyer’s decision regarding the utilization of DRS after
purchasing an IOT device is likely not relevant in assessing the
predominant purpose of a transaction as this test focuses on the
purpose of the transaction at the time the parties entered into
the contract. The predominant purpose test also presumes that
a court can accurately assess the objective of a transaction at
the time of contracting. 131 The parties’ agreement may reference
a stated purpose but a party may have a hidden or alternate
agenda.
The usefulness of IOT smart home devices, such as the Nest
Learning Thermostat, Nest Cam, and Nest Protect, depends
heavily on the services being provided by the company. A buyer
who owns all three of Nest’s products may control and access
these devices through the Nest application. 132 While the
predominant purpose of such a transaction may appear to be the
sale of the device, as I have noted in Part II above, these
products may be attractive to buyers because of the services
provided in connection with the device. One could argue that the
online services provided are even more valuable to the buyer
than the device. Such a transaction could easily be categorized
as a transaction whose predominant purpose is for the provision
131. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974) (“The test for
inclusion or exclusion [in the U.C.C.] is not whether they are mixed, but, granting
that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their
purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally
involved . . . .” (emphasis added)).
132. See Meet The All-New Nest Protect, NEST, https://nest.com/smoke-coalarm/meet-nest-protect (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (providing an overview of Nest
products) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

110

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2017)

of services rather than goods, thereby removing the transaction
from Article 2’s coverage.
Article 2’s definition of goods was drafted during a time in
which goods may have held more value for a buyer than any
accompanying service provided by the seller. 133 In IOT hybrid
transactions, the essence of the transaction is not limited solely
to the provision of the device; the services and software provided
along with the IOT device are just as important to the buyer as
the device itself. 134 Buyers have grown accustomed to receiving
goods that are bundled with services and software. In fact, “the
value of physical devices more and more is defined by the
embedded software inside them or the control software that
helps to manage them.” 135 IOT devices cannot fully operate
without the software and the services provided by the
manufacturer or retailer, but the software and services that are
provided may only be useful to the extent that the buyer has
ownership of the device. Thus, one aspect of a hybrid IOT
transaction may not predominate over another or alternatively,
the provision of software and IOT services may be the
predominant purpose of an IOT transaction.
Now suppose the buyer above who has purchased the
Brother printer from Amazon is dissatisfied with DRS. If a court
determines that Article 2 applies to the transaction under the
predominant purpose test and the dispute is about the service
133. Article 2 was initially published in 1952, a time when the consumer
finance industry grew as Americans sought to buy more consumer goods. See Jan
Logemann, Different Paths to Mass Consumption: Consumer Credit in the United
States and West Germany During the 1950s and ‘60s, 2008 J. SOC. HIST. 525
(noting that, in the post-World War II United States, consumer credit and
consumer culture became the norm).
134. See Vincent Smyth, 2016 Trends: The Internet of Things and Software
Monetisation, IT PRO PORTAL (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.itproportal.com/2015/
12/31/2016-trends-internet-of-things-software-monetisation (last visited Mar. 5,
2017) (“In order to participate in this new industrial revolution . . . IoT makers
are becoming software-centric. This is so because the value of physical devices
more and more is defined by the embedded software inside them or the control
software that helps to manage them.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
135. See id. (“This is obvious when we consider our own smartphones and
tablets—they’re valuable to us because of the specific apps we each run on them
that make them personal and productive for our own purposes.”).
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and the printer—for instance where the printer is defective—
courts are likely to apply the relevant provisions of Article 2 to
resolve the entire dispute. 136 However, where a transaction
involves the provision of goods and services a court may apply
Article 2 only to the goods aspect of the contract and the common
law to the services portion of the transaction. 137
Additionally, using the factors set forth by the Fourth
Circuit in Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass
Corp., 138 the nature of the seller’s business should also be
considered. How should courts assess the nature of Amazon’s
business? Is the percentage of profits generated by the sale of
goods versus services or the number of goods sold directly by
Amazon in comparison to the number of goods sold by third
party sellers on Amazon determinative? Amazon is in the
business of selling various goods but, as more products become
enabled with DRS and as more buyers begin to use the Amazon
Dash Button, these questions may not be easily answered.
Additionally, where the purchase of an IOT device is
accompanied by a software license agreement, multiple
contracts for services, such as a mobile application or
136. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES 162 (2d ed.
1989) (“[I]f the contract is predominantly for the sale of goods, the UCC is applied
to the full transaction.”).
137. See Stephenson v. Frazier, 399 N.E.2d 794, 797–98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(applying the common law to the services aspect of a hybrid transaction and the
UCC to the goods aspect of the transaction). Courts have reached varying results
on this issue with most seemingly rejecting this approach. See H. Hirschfield
Sons, Co. v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 309 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(relying on the rationale in Stephenson and declining to apply Article 2 to a
transaction in which there was a separate price for installation and the claim
related exclusively to the installation aspect of the contract); Reynolds v.
Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. (Mass. App. Div. 1972) (applying UCC implied warranties
to the sale and installation of gutters in the plaintiff’s home and finding the
warranties were breached due to the faulty installation); see also Milau Assocs. v.
North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 486–87 (N.Y. 1977) (questioning whether
the UCC’s implied warranties can apply only to the goods aspect of a hybrid
transaction and finding that the contract at issue was predominately service
oriented); Paint Prod. Co. v. AA-1 Steel Equip. Co., 393 A.2d 1317 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1977) (finding that “a contract for the sale of a product and its
installation . . . should be considered as a unified whole and not divided into
separate and independent parts.”).
138. 706 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1983).
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installation services, and a contract explaining the company’s
terms and conditions for the sale of the device, what is the
predominant purpose of such a transaction given that the entire
transaction is subject to multiple separate and distinct
agreements? Given the deficiencies of the predominant purpose
test, the gravamen of the claim test has been offered as an
alternative. 139
2. Gravamen of the Claim Test
The gravamen of the claim test focuses on whether the
dispute concerns the goods or the services. 140 If the claim relates
to the services, then Article 2 does not apply and, if the dispute
relates to the goods aspect of the transaction, then Article 2 will
govern. 141 When strictly applied, this test may supply some
certainty to sellers and buyers. Parties would know in advance
that, if the goods aspect of the transaction formed the gravamen
of the action for relief, Article 2 would apply and its
accompanying warranties would be applicable unless
specifically disclaimed.
The gravamen of the claim test has been heavily criticized
for several reasons. 142 The test provides very little guidance in
139. See HAWKLAND, supra note 8, § 2-102 (discussing the gravamen of the
claim test and noting that the test “has not won widespread acceptance in the
courts.”).
140. See id. § 2-51 (“Under this test, Article 2 would apply to the goods aspect
of the transaction if that aspect of the transaction formed the gravamen of the
action for relief.”); see also Anthony Pools v. Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 441 (Md.
1983) (noting that where consumer goods “are sold and monetary loss or personal
injury is claimed to have resulted from a defect in the consumer goods,” the
provisions of the Maryland U.C.C. dealing with implied warranties apply, “even
if the transaction is predominately one for the rendering of consumer services”).
141. See J.O. Hooker & Sons, Inc. v. Roberts Cabinet Co., 683 So. 2d 396, 400
(Miss. 1996) (“[I]n such a mixed transaction, whether or not the contract should
be interpreted under the UCC or our general contract law should depend upon
the nature of the contract and also upon whether the dispute in question
primarily concerns the goods furnished or the services rendered under the
contract.”).
142. See, e.g., Austin Bodnar, Mixed Transactions for Goods and Services: The
Need for Consistency in Choosing the Governing Law, 27 SAINT THOMAS L. REV.
225, 238 (2015) (“[T]he main problem with using the gravamen standard is that
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attempting to assess whether the plaintiff’s claim relates to the
goods or the services. 143 In order to determine which law governs
a transaction, one of the parties must first bring suit and then
await the court’s determination of whether the dispute is about
the goods or the services. 144
The test also presents difficulties when applied to IOT
transactions. For example, a plaintiff may be unsatisfied with
various IOT services but drafts the complaint to imply that the
dispute is about the goods. Where the ordering service software
is directly embedded within the goods or the service is provided
through the goods, such as when a Brita water pitcher is
integrated with Amazon’s DRS, how does one apply the
gravamen test where the plaintiff wants to contest contract
formation? In that instance, is the claim related to the Brita
filter, the pitcher, Amazon’s DRS, or defective software? The
gravamen of the claim test is difficult to apply in such an
instance.
Consider a buyer that obtains an IOT device and
simultaneously enters into an agreement with the manufacturer
for an energy monitoring service. The IOT device collects data
monthly about the owner’s heating and air conditioning usage
and adjusts the temperature in the owner’s office. Assume
further that after the owner authorizes its utility providers to
share data with the IOT manufacturer, the energy reporting
service combines data from the IOT device and utility companies
(water, gas and electric) to generate a complete picture of the
owner’s energy use. If a plaintiff believes that this IOT device is
ineffectively or incorrectly monitoring and impacting energy use
as described in the monthly energy reports, is the defect simply
due to the energy reporting service or is the device and the
embedded software itself defective, thereby causing the
misleading reports? Moreover, if a plaintiff contends that both
it prevents parties from knowing what law governs their contract at its inception,
which leaves the parties unaware of their rights and obligations under the
contract until a dispute arises.”).
143. See RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 120, at 26 (detailing the requirements
of the test).
144. See Bodnar, supra note 142, at 238 (discussing conflicting parties’
uncertainty as to the law governing their dispute prior to a judge’s
determination).

114

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2017)

the IOT services and the device are inadequate or defective,
should we view the gravamen of the dispute as concerning the
services or the goods? Application of the gravamen of the claim
test is unlikely to yield consistent and dispositive answers in the
IOT context.
B. Service Contracts and Other Sources of Law
As discussed in Part III above, a court may apply Article 2
and its implied warranties to the goods aspect of the hybrid
transaction and a different source of law to the non-goods aspect
of the transaction. 145 Thus, courts could use another source of
law, such as the common law, to resolve the parties’ dispute
where a component test is used or where a court determines
under the gravamen of the claim or the predominant purpose
tests that Article 2 does not apply to a hybrid transaction.
Further, the Warranty Act may apply to transactions that are
subject to Article 2 and the common law.
1. Common Law Warranties
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose which are found in the UCC are likely not
applicable to service contracts. 146 To the extent that a court
145. See Foster v. Colo. Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222, 226 (10th Cir. 1967)
(finding that Article 2 can be applied to the goods aspect of a transaction which
involved the sale of office equipment and furnishings, real estate, studios and
transmission equipment). This test assumes that a hybrid transaction is
comprised of two separate transactions—one for goods and one for non-goods, and
does not appear to depend mainly on whether the dispute relates to the goods, but
rather evaluates whether a portion of the transaction meets the definition of
goods. Taylor, infra note 146, at 253 (distinguishing the components test from the
gravamen of the claim test). To the extent that the component test is used,
multiple sources of law including the common law and the UCC may apply to an
IOT transaction.
146. See Ellen Taylor, Applicability of Strict Liability Warranty Theories to
Service Transactions, 47 S.C. L. REV. 231, 255 (1996) (“[T]he majority position is
still that implied warranties do not attach to service transactions . . . .”); see also
Cargill, Inc. v. Ron Burge Trucking, Inc., No. 11-2394, 2013 WL 608520, at *3 (D.
Minn. Feb. 19, 2013) (finding that the implied warranty of fitness for a particular
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determines that Article 2 does not apply to an IOT transaction
after applying the predominant purpose or the gravamen of the
claim tests, a consumer is unlikely to receive the benefits of the
implied warranties under Article 2. However, a consumer could
attempt to use implied warranties that may arise under the
common law to fill this gap.
While the manufacturer of an IOT device may provide an
express warranty, such a warranty is likely to extend to the
device but not to the product replacement, monitoring, and other
online services provided in connection with the device. For
instance, the manufacturer of a Brother printer may provide a
limited express warranty that covers the printer and its
accessories, but DRS as well as the embedded firmware provided
by Brother are likely not subject to the warranty. 147 Similarly,
Nest’s terms of use explicitly provide that the company makes
no warranties that its “services will be available on an
uninterrupted basis, timely, secure or error-free and in no event
will its services constitute a warranty.” 148
Courts have imposed implied duties on service contracts
involving professionals but have been reluctant to extend
implied warranties to all service contracts. 149 For instance, in a
purpose did not arise by operation of law in service contracts).
147. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 57; see also
Conditions of Use, supra note 57; Amazon’s Dash Replenishment Service Brother
User Terms, supra note 56 (noting that Brother provides no warranties with
respect to the DRS service or its embedded firmware); Brother Digital Color OneYear Limited Warranty and Replacement Service, BROTHER INDUSTRIES (2012),
http://www.brother-usa.com/VirData/Content/en-US/Printers/Warranty
Documents/WarrantyStatements/DigitalColor_1YRExchangeWarranty_0605201
2.pdf (providing for a limited warranty and replacement service which covers the
machine and accompanying consumable and accessory items).
148. See Limited Warranty Thermostat, supra note 79 (noting that all product
information and services provided by Nest are provided on an “as-is” basis); see
also Terms of Service, NEST supra note 76 (noting that all warranties for the
services provided by Nest, including my energy service, are disclaimed).
149. See, e.g., Pearl Invs. LLC v. Std. I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 352 (2003)
(noting that courts have been wary of recognizing implied warranties in the
context of performance of services, doing so only for compelling public-policy
reasons); Bloomsburg Mills, Inc. v. Sardoni Constr. Co., 164 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa.
1960) (noting that “while an architect is not an absolute insurer of perfect plans,
he is called upon to prepare plans and specifications which will give the structure
so designed reasonable fitness for its intended use, and he impliedly warrants
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2016 decision, a Michigan court found that the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose did not apply to a contract for
the provision of architectural services. 150 Despite this majority
position, courts have imposed implied warranties in service
contracts in some cases, such as the implied warranty of
workmanlike or skillful performance and the implied warranty
of fitness, habitability, and suitability. 151 Other courts have held
that implied warranties are not applicable where service
contracts are at issue as they are akin to the duty of care in a
negligence action and as such cannot give rise to a breach of
warranty claim. 152
their sufficiency for that purpose”); E. Grand Forks v. Steele, 141 N.W. 181, 182
(Minn. 1913) (noting that “[d]efendants represented themselves as expert
accountants, which implied that they were skilled in that class of work. In
accepting employment as expert accountants, they undertook, and the plaintiff
had the right to expect, that in the performance of their duties they would exercise
the average ability and skill of those engaged in that branch of skilled labor”). But
see Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v. D. E. Britt Assocs., Inc., 168 So.
2d 333, 335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (finding that an engineer does not warrant
his services to be merchantability or fit for an intended use but rather warrants
that he will exercise his skill pursuant to a reasonable standard of care and
breach of this warranty occurs where the professional is negligent).
150. See Albion College v. Stockade Buildings, Inc., No. 322917, 2016 Mich.
App. LEXIS 998, at *6 (Mich. Ct. App. May 17, 2016) (holding that the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purposes applies only to the sale of goods or
electricity).
151. See Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649, 653 (N.D.
1977) (noting that an implied warranty of fitness may apply to construction
contracts); Omaha Pollution Control Corp. v. Carver-Greenfield Corp., 413 F.
Supp. 1069, 1085–86 (D. Neb. 1976) (holding that an implied warranty of
merchantability and fitness attached to the design and construction of a sewage
plant); Corral v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 732 P.2d 1260, 1268 (Kan. 1987)
(reasoning that warranties, express or implied, may be present in any type of
contract including sales, leases, bailments, and service agreements, and holding
that the trial court was in error when it concluded that there could be no implied
warranties outside the ambit of the UCC); Weeks v. Slavik Builders, Inc., 180
N.W.2d 503, 506–07 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (extending the implied warranty of
fitness to the sale of new residential houses); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 329
P.2d 474, 476 (Wash. 1958) (holding that the implied warranty of habitability
applied to a home construction contract). See generally E. Allan Farnsworth,
Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957)
(identifying and exploring various implied warranties).
152. See Cargill, Inc. v. Ron Burge Trucking, Inc., No. 11-2394, 2013 WL
608520, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2013) (noting that in a service contract any
implied duty to perform the work or services skillfully, carefully, and in a
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As discussed above, IOT transactions will typically involve
the provision of ongoing services by retailers such as Amazon
and Nest. 153 However, as currently envisioned, IOT service
contracts between consumers and businesses do not involve the
construction of a device but rather involve the use of pre-existing
ordering or application services. Thus, the applicability of these
types of common-law warranties to consumer IOT transactions
is questionable. In contrast, in the industrial IOT setting,
businesses may require sellers to design, construct and
customize IOT devices for use in manufacturing and business
operations. One could posit that common-law implied
warranties should be extended to cover services in such
contracts or, alternatively, that courts should apply the UCC’s
implied warranties by analogy. 154 Given the fact that most
courts are reluctant to extend such warranties to service
contracts it is unlikely that this argument will succeed.
Where an IOT hybrid transaction involves the installation
or provision of a device which impacts the habitability of a home,
one could argue that the implied warranties found by courts to
be applicable to service contracts should be extended to such IOT
hybrid transactions. However, the implied warranty of
habitability has historically applied to the sale or construction
of a new home or in the tenancy context, and not to the
performance of goods or services within the home after
construction. 155
workmanlike manner is a duty of care and not a warranty that can give rise to a
breach of warranty claim); see also Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner
Serv. Co., 427 P.2d 833, 841–42 (Alaska 1967) (finding that a cause of action for
breach of an implied warranty to repair in a workmanlike manner is identical to
a negligence claim).
153. See supra Part I (discussing and providing examples of retailers
providing ongoing services in IOT transactions).
154. See generally Peter A. Alces & Aaron S. Book, When Y2K Causes
“Economic Loss” to “Other Property,” 84 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1999) (contending that,
where a court determines that the same commercial principles are implicated in
a non-Article 2 contract as are vindicated by the warranty provisions of Articles
2 and 2A, it would be entirely appropriate for the court to apply the UCC implied
warranty provisions by analogy).
155. See Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113, 121 (1931) (“It is plain
that in those circumstances there is an implication of law that the house shall be
reasonably fit for the purpose for which it is required, that is for human
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IOT contracts contain warranty disclaimers and limitation
of damages provisions. 156 To the extent that a consumer is
physically injured by an IOT device, Article 2 provides that a
limitation of consequential damages for personal injury in the
case of consumer goods is viewed as prima facie
unconscionable. 157 However, while not absolute, this additional
protection for consumers is likely only available where Article 2
applies to the transaction unless another relevant source of law
contains a similar provision. Courts are also reluctant to strike
down contract terms on the grounds of unconscionability. 158
Additionally, pursuant to section 1-103 of the UCC,
common-law warranties in sale of goods transactions may be
displaced by Article 2’s implied warranties. 159 Courts have held
that implied warranties are applicable to goods not services. For
instance, in Dobisky v. Rand, 160 the court stated “[New York]
does not recognize a cause of action in breach of warranty for the
performance of services.” 161 Similarly, in Aegis Productions, Inc.
v. Arriflex Corp. of America, 162 the court stated “warranties are
dwelling.”); see also Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 229 S.E.2d 728, 730–31 (S.C.
1976) (holding that the implied warranty of habitability is applicable even where
the seller of the new home is not the builder); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 175 S.E.2d
792, 795 (S.C. 1970) (holding that an implied warranty of habitability applies to
a contract involving the construction of a new home).
156. See generally, e.g., Amazon Dash Button Terms of Use, supra note 57;
Conditions of Use, supra note 57.
157. See U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002)
(“Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or
exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation
of damages where the loss is commercial is not.”).
158. See, e.g., In re Emery-Watson, 412 B.R. 670, 674 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009)
(“[C]ourts generally, and this Court in particular, are reluctant to void contracts
on grounds of unconscionability . . . .”).
159. See U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (“Unless
displaced by particular provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to
capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation,
duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause
supplement its provisions.”).
160. 670 N.Y.S.2d 606 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
161. Id. at 608.
162. Aegis Prods., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of Am., 268 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187 (N.Y.
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limited to [the] sales of goods. No warranty attaches to the
performance of a service. . . . No such right has ever been
extended to include the consequence of a performance of a
service.” 163 Thus, it is questionable whether common-law
implied warranties will be applicable to IOT transactions.
Additionally, even if one were to contend that common-law
implied warranties are applicable to a transaction, such an
argument may fail where there is an express agreement between
the parties. A party may be able to successfully defend against
such claims by contending that the common law disfavors
implied contract terms and that the parties have an express
agreement disclaiming such warranties. 164
2. Warranty Act
In addition to state statutes and common law rules
regarding implied warranties, the Warranty Act may also be
applicable to consumer IOT transactions and afford additional
protections to consumers. 165 The Warranty Act applies to
written warranties of consumer products, implied warranties
that arise under state law, and service contracts relating to
consumer products. 166 IOT devices may meet the definition of
consumer products under the Warranty Act as these devices are
tangible personal property distributed in commerce and they
App. Div. 1966).
163. Id. at 187.
164. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 980 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that plaintiff’s common law
implied warranty claims failed because the terms of the parties’ agreement
contained a disclaimer of warranties and statutory and common law implied
warranties can be disclaimed by conspicuous language in a contract presented to
the consumer at the time of the transaction).
165. Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 108(A), 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006)).
166. See RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 120, at 337 (stating that “the
Magnuson-Moss Act . . . . does not have a single provision that identifies the
situations to which it applies. Therefore, one must peruse the operative sections
of the act, identify key words, and then review the statutory definitions of those
terms to ascertain the scope of the act”).
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can be used for personal, family, or household purposes. 167
However, it is unclear whether the definition of tangible
personal property and, therefore, consumer products under the
statute would include the transfer of software. 168
The statute provides a consumer with a cause of action
where a consumer suffers harm from a supplier’s, warrantor’s or
service contractor’s violation of the provisions of the Warranty
Act, or the breach of a written warranty, implied warranty or
service contract. 169 The Warranty Act does not require that
suppliers provide a warranty, but instead, mandates that where
a warrantor provides a written warranty, the warrantor must
comply with adopted Federal Trade Commission (FTC) rules. 170
To the extent that the Warranty Act covers IOT hybrid
transactions, it would prohibit a supplier from disclaiming an
implied warranty when a written warranty is provided for an
IOT device or if “at the time of sale, or within 90 days thereafter,
[the] supplier enters into a service contract with the consumer
which applies to [the] consumer product.” 171 Under the
167. See id. § 2301(1) (defining consumer products as tangible personal
property which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes).
168. See 2 BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT
WARRANTIES § 14:3 (2015) (noting that, as of 2015, the Federal Trade Commission
has not elaborated on this issue). But see generally Microsoft Corp. v. Manning,
914 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App. 1995) (suggesting that the Warranty Act can apply to
the transfer of software programs and information products).
169. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (2012) (providing and detailing remedial
procedures under the Warranty Act); see also RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note 120,
at 336 (contending that the key benefit of the Warranty Act “is that if a warrantor
violates its obligations under the Act, the injured ‘consumer’ is entitled to recover
the reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in any successful enforcement
action . . . . [and] [t]his right is critical because it gives injured consumers the
ability to prosecute a claim that would otherwise be too small to justify the
expense involved.”).
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (providing for various requirements which attach
upon provision of a written warranty and adoption of the FTC rules).
171. Id. § 2308(a). Under the statute an implied warranty is defined as an
implied warranty that arises under state law (as modified by the act’s provisions
on implied warranties and minimum standards for warranties) in connection with
the sale of a consumer product. Id. § 2301(7). A written warranty is defined as a
written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of
a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the
material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or
workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a
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Warranty Act, implied warranties are defined as those which
“arise under state law” and therefore, the Warranty Act’s
prohibition of implied warranty disclaimers may only apply to
the extent that the implied warranties “arise under state law.”
If a court were to determine that Article 2 does not apply to a
transaction, the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose would not “arise under state law”
for purposes of the Warranty Act. On the other hand, one could
contend that the definition of an implied warranty under the
Warranty Act suggests that it is modified by the provisions of
the act prohibiting implied warranty disclaimers and these
provisions apply to any implied warranty, including implied
warranties that may arise under the common law. However, as
noted in Part III(b)(1) above, some courts have found that
implied warranties are primarily applicable to goods, which are
usually governed by Article 2 (or 2A of the UCC which has
similar implied warranties), and given the provisions of the
Warranty Act that refer to a sale, unless another source of law
requires otherwise, these courts may be unwilling to apply to
IOT transactions implied warranties that do not arise under the
UCC. 172 Thus, in order for the Warranty Act’s prohibition on the
disclaimer of implied warranties to be effective at protecting
consumers, it is likely that Article 2 must apply to the
transaction.
A supplier that offers a limited warranty rather than a full
warranty is free to limit the duration of the implied warranties
to the duration of “a written warranty of reasonable duration.” 173
Where the manufacturer provides a written warranty that lasts
for several years, this may be beneficial to consumers. However,
that may not be the case where the duration of the written
warranty is short.
specified period of time, or any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale
by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other
remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails
to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which becomes part of the
basis of the bargain. Id. § 2301(6).
172. See generally Part III.
173. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 108(b) (2012) (stating that such a
duration limitation must be conspicuous and conscionable).
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Recent studies of warranties subject to the Warranty Act
have found that manufacturers are routinely providing
consumers with limited rather than full warranties. 174 Nest
labels the warranty it provides for its IOT products as a “limited
warranty” and the company also attempts to limit the duration
of any applicable implied warranties to the duration of the
written warranty. 175 To the extent that IOT manufacturers
provide limited rather than full warranties, consumers may not
receive the additional protections provided under the Warranty
Act. Where a full warranty is provided, a supplier may not limit
the duration of implied warranties or “impose any unreasonable
duty as a condition of warranty coverage.” 176
Today, warranties are seven times lengthier than they were
in 1977 (two years after the Warranty Act was enacted). 177 As a
result, consumers may be less likely to read such warranties. 178
This is particularly concerning given the fact that the Warranty
Act was intended to facilitate consumer understanding of
warranties and to allow consumers to easily differentiate
between reliable and non-reliable products. According to a 2012
warranty analysis, manufacturers also routinely ignore the
Warranty Act’s prohibition of implied warranty disclaimers and
include disclaimer language in their terms and conditions. 179
The FTC has been criticized for a perceived failure to effectively
implement the statute. 180 Increased FTC enforcement of the
Warranty Act is needed. Both Nest and Amazon’s terms of
service contain disclaimers of the implied Article 2

174. See Janet W. Steverson & Aaron Munter, Then and Now: Reviving the
Promise of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 63 KAN. L. REV. 227, 245 (2015)
(surveying recent warranties).
175. Limited Warranty Smoke Alarm, NEST, https://nest.com/legal/warranty/
smokealarm/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
176. Steverson & Munter, supra note 174, at 244. See generally
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 2304(b)(1).
177. Steverson & Munter, supra note 174, at 245–53.
178. See id. (outlining the growth in the length of warranties).
179. Id. at 254.
180. See id. at 256 (charging the FTC with failing to actively pursue violators).
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warranties. 181 The inclusion of such disclaimer language may
discourage consumers from bringing suit even where the
disclaimer is invalid under the Warranty Act or state law.
The Warranty Act also permits suppliers to enter into
service contracts with consumers in lieu of a warranty provided
that contract terms are conspicuously disclosed and easily
understandable. 182 The service contracts covered by the
Warranty Act are those in which a seller has made a
commitment to maintain or repair consumer products over a
specified period. 183 As discussed in Part II above, IOT service
contracts are distinct from the maintenance service contracts
typically provided by service providers. Of course, companies
manufacturing IOT devices may ultimately offer standard
service contracts for the maintenance of IOT devices, thereby
potentially making the Warranty Act applicable to the
transaction.
IOT companies such as Nest currently do not provide
warranties for the services provided in connection with an IOT
device, but a limited warranty applies to its devices including
Dropcam, the Nest Learning Thermostat, Nest Protect and Nest
Cam. 184 Because the services provided in connection with IOT
devices may not qualify as a service contract under the
Warranty Act, the Warranty Act’s prohibition on the disclaimer
of implied warranties may not apply to the majority of services
currently provided by IOT companies where a written warranty
is not provided.
Despite the consumer protections contained in the
Warranty Act, some courts have unfortunately limited the
effectiveness of the statute. 185 Some courts have held that where
181. Limited Warranty Smoke Alarm, supra note 175.
182. See 15 U.S.C. § 2306 (2012) (addressing service contracts on consumer
products).
183. See id. § 2301(8) (defining a service contract as “a contract in writing to
perform, over a fixed period of time or for a specified duration, services relating
to the maintenance or repair (or both) of a consumer product”).
184. Terms of Service, supra note 76; see also Limited Warranty Thermostat,
supra note 79 (providing for a two-year limited warranty for the Nest thermostat);
End User License Agreement, supra note 78 (noting that the software is sold “as
is” and all implied warranties are disclaimed).
185. See Janet W. Steverson, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Magnuson Moss
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a supplier has not provided a written warranty, consumers are
barred from bringing an action for breach of implied warranties
and they have imposed privity requirements in warranty
claims. 186 In some jurisdictions, vertical privity is still a
requirement for breach of implied warranty claims and as a
result, courts have required that consumers satisfy state law
privity requirements in order to bring a breach of warranty
claim under the Warranty Act. 187 These courts have ignored the
provisions of the Warranty Act, which describe the parties who
may be sued and those that are authorized to bring suit under
the statute. 188 Under the statute, both a seller or manufacturer
may qualify as a warrantor and any consumer to whom the goods
are transferred is entitled to sue. 189 These provisions suggest

Warranty Act, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 155, 176–77 (2014) (noting that courts
have not allowed consumers to bring bare implied breach of warranty claims nor
held that the act overturns common law privity requirements).
186. See Kutzler v. Thor Indus., Inc., No. 03 C 2389, 2003 WL 21654260, at
*7 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2003) (finding that privity is required to assert an implied
warranty claim in an economic loss case and reasoning that revocation of
acceptance under § 2310(d) of the Warranty Act is unavailable against a
manufacturer who is not a party to the sales because § 2-608 of the UCC on its
face contemplates that the remedy of revocation is available only against a seller);
Hamdan v. Land Rover North Am., Inc., No. 03 C 2051, 2003 WL 21911244, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2003) (concluding that a plaintiff is barred from pursing an
implied warranty claim under Magnuson-Moss if state law requires privity for
the claim to succeed); McNamara v. Nomeco Bldg. Specialties, Inc., 26 F. Supp.
2d 1168, 1175 (D. Minn. 1998) (concluding that there was no Magnuson Act claim
for breach of implied warranty since there was no written warranty). But see
Mattuck v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 852 N.E.2d 485, 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006),
vacated by 877 N.E.2d 1, 1 (Ill. 2007) (finding that the Warranty Act relaxes the
privity requirement found under the UCC); Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 433
A.2d 801, 808 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (finding that the Warranty Act
eliminates privity requirements).
187. See Curl v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 871 N.E.2d 1141, 1145–47 (Ohio
2007) (“Ohio continues to require privity as to contract claims.”); Cerasani v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 916 So. 2d 843, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (concluding that
the Magnuson-Moss Act applied to the transaction but the act does not supersede
privity requirements for implied warranties); Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633
P.2d 383, 386–87 (Ariz. 1981) (imposing a privity requirement on implied
warranty claims).
188. See Steverson, supra note 185, at 178 (cataloging the causes of action
explicitly authorized the MMWA).
189. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act § 101(3), (4) & (5) (2012).
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that vertical privity is not a requirement for suit. 190 Thus, while
the Warranty Act may be applicable to some IOT transactions
the effectiveness of the Warranty Act in providing adequate
protection to consumers is questionable.
C. Software and Goods Under Article 2
As noted in Part II above, hybrid IOT transactions involve
not only the provision of services but also software. Thus, UCC
case law on software transactions is germane to any discussion
of Article 2’s role in determinations evaluating hybrid IOT
transactions. Hybrid software transactions frequently arise
where software is provided along with hardware or other
products. 191 In the consumer context, a hybrid transaction may
also arise where software, which may be viewed as a good, is
provided along with services, such as installation, debugging,
and other support services. 192
190. See id. § 2310(d)(1) (listing and authorizing cognizable claims);
Steverson, supra note 185, at 186 (arguing that by authorizing suits against
warrantors, suppliers, and service contractors, § 2310(d)(1) does away with any
requirement of vertical privity); see also CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., NAT’L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER WARRANTY LAW: LEMON LAW, MAGNUSON-MOSS,
UCC, MANUFACTURED HOME, AND OTHER WARRANTY STATUTES § 2.3.6.2 (4th ed.
2010) (“[T]he Act’s definitions of supplier and warrantor indicate that vertical
privity is not required. The definition of supplier includes those who make
products directly or indirectly available to consumers, encompassing remote
manufacturers who indirectly make products available to consumers.”).
191. See RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985)
(finding that the sales aspect of a software transaction for the transfer of
prepackaged software predominated and the other aspects of the transfer were
incidental to the sale of the software package and thus the transaction was a sale
of goods subject to Article 2); Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. 604
F.2d 737, 742–43 (2d Cir. 1979) (evaluating custom application software
specifically designed for individual needs of the customer and finding that the
predominant factor was the sale of goods while services were merely incidental);
Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D. N.J.
1979) (finding that a contract for the provision of hardware and software was a
sale of goods notwithstanding the incidental service aspects of the transaction).
192. See Andrew Rodau, Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code Apply?, 35 EMORY L.J. 853, 914–16 (1986) (describing typical
transactions in which the provision of software is accompanied by an offering of
ancillary services).
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In some instances, courts have applied Article 2 to
transactions involving software. 193 For instance, in Micro Data
Base Systems v. Dharma Systems, 194 the Seventh Circuit stated
“we can think of no reason why the UCC is not suitable to govern
disputes arising from the sale of custom software—so we’ll
follow it.” 195 Courts have also found that an agreement for the
transfer of “off-the-rack” software is a transaction in goods. 196
In contrast, some courts have reasoned that Article 2
applies only to sales rather than to licenses. 197 The “sale vs.
193. See Advent Sys., Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991)
(noting that intellectual property law does not prevent the application of Article
2 and that “[t]he fact that some [software] programs may be tailored for specific
purposes need not alter their status as ‘goods’”). See generally Dreier Co., Inc. v.
Unitronix Corp. 527 A.2d. 875 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986) (applying Article 2 to
a transaction involving the sale of a computer system including hardware and
payroll software). Scholars have also argued for the application of Article 2 to
transactions involving the provision of software products. See Jean Braucher,
supra note 34, at 241 (contending that one body of law should govern transactions
involving hardware and software); Bonna Lynn Horovitz, Note, Computer
Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Taking a Byte Out of
the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U. L. REV. 129, 136 (1985) (contending that all
software transactions which are not clearly and exclusively contracts for the
provision of services should be subject to Article 2’s provisions, regardless of
software’s inherent intangibility, regardless of its labor-intensive element, and
regardless of its tendency to be conveyed in forms other than a traditional sale).
194. 148 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 1998).
195. See id. at 654 (noting that Article 2 can apply to custom software
licenses).
196. See Gross v. Symantec Corp., No. C 12–00154 CRB (N.D. Cal. July 31,
2012) (reasoning that downloaded software was a good subject to the UCC similar
to a sale software in a store and did not include installation, training,
maintenance, or upgrading services); Olcott Int’l & Co. v. Micro Data Base Sys.,
Inc., 793 N.E. 2d 1063, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that Article 2 of UCC
applied to a contract for the purchase of “pre-existing, standardized” software);
SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (reasoning that a transaction related to Adobe software was a sale of goods
and not a license because the purchaser obtains a single copy of the software, for
a single price, which constitutes the entire payment for the ‘license,’ which runs
for an indefinite term without renewal provisions).
197. See generally Digital Ally, Inc. v. Z3 Tech., LLC, Case No. 09-2292-KGS,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103715, at *32 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding that
Article 2 does not apply to a software licensing agreement as title to the product
was not transferred to the buyer); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, 84 F. Supp.
2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (declining to apply Article 2 to prepackaged software
products such as Adobe Photoshop); Kane v. Fed. Express Corp., No. CV990078971S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2536 (Conn. Super. Aug. 28, 2001) (noting
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license” distinction is an important one. Where a court finds that
a transaction is a license of software rather than a sale, the
terms of the licensing agreement will normally control the
transaction subject to applicable contract formation rules and
defenses to enforcement. 198 If the software transaction is a sale
and is subject to Article 2, several additional issues arise. First,
Article 2 frequently allows parties to contract out of provisions
that may be beneficial to buyers. The ability of parties to
disclaim implied warranties is one such area. Second, state
consumer statutes, as well as a state’s version of the UCC, may
in some instances provide additional protection to consumers.
For instance, some jurisdictions prohibit the disclaimer of
implied warranties in consumer transactions. 199 State unfair
and deceptive practices statutes may be limited to tangible
goods or services. It is questionable whether software
constitutes a good under such statutes, as it may not be viewed
as tangible even though it may be moveable for purposes of
Article 2. 200 Of course, software may in some instances qualify
that a transaction cannot be characterized as a sale under Article 2 of the UCC
“where it does not contemplate the passage of title from the plaintiff to the
defendant”).
198. See Nancy S. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, 2008 BYU L. REV.
1103, 1135–36 (2008) [hereinafter Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma]
(describing the operation of contract principles once an agreement is determined
to be a license).
199. ALA. CODE §§ 7-2-316(5), 7-2-719(4) (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42A2-316 (West 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-316.1 (West 1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-639(A) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (1992); MD. CODE
ANN. COM. LAW § 2-316.1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316.A (1992); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-7-18; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (West 1992); W. VA.
CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992).
200. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761–1770 (West) (defining goods as tangible
chattel and services as work, labor, and services for other than a commercial or
business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of
goods and prohibiting unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer); see also
Ladore v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., LLC, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(finding that a video game was a “good” under the California Legal Remedies Act
where the software was purchased in a physical medium, as opposed to
downloaded from the internet); Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., 2010 WL 3910169, at
*14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (holding that California’s Consumer Legal Remedies
Act does not cover transactions related to the sale or lease of software as software
is not a tangible good or a service for purposes of the Consumer Legal Remedies
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as a service, thereby bringing the transaction within the scope
of state consumer protection statutes. 201 Where a software
transaction constitutes a sale that is subject to Article 2 rather
than a license, the “written document states the licensor’s
obligations, but it does not necessarily serve as an effective
limitation of those obligations unless those limitations conform
to applicable law.” 202 Buyers may be more adequately protected
where a hybrid transaction is viewed as a sale subject to Article
2 rather than a license.
The application of Article 2 to transactions involving
software has been heavily criticized. 203 Article 2 defines a sale
as the passing of title from seller to buyer for a price. 204 In a
software transaction, title to the software may not pass from the
seller to the buyer and software may not always satisfy Article
2’s definition of goods—a movable thing. 205 However, as
Act, which covers tangible chattel only); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(8) (2013)
(defining “trade” and “commerce” as “advertising, offering or distributing,
whether by sale, rental or otherwise, any real estate, goods or services); W. VA.
CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992) (prohibiting unfair methods of competition and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce and defining
trade or commerce as the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any
goods or services and shall include any trade or commerce, directly or indirectly,
affecting the people of the state).
201. See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605(8) (2013) (defining “trade” and “commerce”
as “advertising, offering or distributing, whether by sale, rental or otherwise, any
real estate, goods or services”); W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1992) (disallowing
modification of express and implied warranties for goods and for goods alone).
202. Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, supra note 198, at 1139.
203. See generally Lorin Brenan, Financing Intellectual Property Under
Revised Article 9: National and International Conflicts, 23 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 313, 464 (2001). Scholars have also critiqued the application of implied
warranties to computer programs. See generally Joel Wolfson, Express Warranties
and Published Information Content Under Article 2B: Does the Shoe Fit?, 16 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 337 (1997); Joel Wolfson, Electronic Mass
Information Providers and Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: The
First Amendment Casts a Long Shadow, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 67 (1997); Jean
Braucher, Why UCITA, Like Article 2B, Is Premature and Unsound, in A GUIDE
TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (Carol
Kunze ed., 1996).
204. U.C.C. § 2-106 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
205. Id. § 2-105; see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 2016 WL
3435196, at *10 (E.D.N.C. June 17, 2016) (finding that a software license
agreement did not transfer title and therefore Article 2 did not apply); Ferrington
v. McAfee, Inc., 2010 WL 3910169, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (concluding that
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Professor Jean Braucher notes, the official comments of Article
2 suggest a flexible approach to the concept of title. 206 Article 2’s
provisions do not automatically remove a transaction from its
scope simply because a seller attempts to retain title to the goods
in the transaction. 207 Additionally, software can be viewed as
movable as it can be transported through various means, such
as on a disc, device, or downloading. Article 2 applies to
transactions in goods. The use of the term “transaction” rather
than “sale” suggests that Article 2’s scope is not limited to
agreements in which title is transferred from seller to buyer. 208
As Professor Nancy Kim notes, the sale of a software
product does not exclude a license of the software and vice
versa. 209 The sale of an IOT device potentially includes both a
purchase by the buyer of the hardware of the IOT device as well
as a license to use the accompanying software programs subject
to certain restrictions. Article 9 of the UCC recognizes that
goods can be sold to a buyer while the purchaser simultaneously
receives the right to use the software accompanying the goods

California law did not support the contention that software is a tangible good or
a service for purpose of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, which covers tangible
chattels, because software is not tangible); Berthold Types Ltd. v. Adobe Sys.,
Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 697, 698 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“[T]he UCC does not apply to this
transaction because it involves only granting a license and not a sale of
goods . . . . [A] pure license agreement . . . does not involve transfer of title, and so
is not a sale for Article 2 purposes.”).
206. See Braucher, supra note 34, at 276 (arguing that Article 2 does not use
“title” in a formal, non-functional way).
207. See U.C.C. § 2-401 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002)
(noting that the Article deals with issues between seller and buyer in terms of
step by step performance or non-performance under the contract for sale and not
in terms of whether or no title to the goods has passed); id. § 2-401 (limiting the
effect of an attempted reservation of title to a security interest).
208. See Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., 935 F. Supp. 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (noting that “the applicability of Article Two to a transaction is not defeated
by the use of a license in lieu of a sale if the license provides for transfer of some
of the incidents of goods ownership” (citations omitted)).
209. See Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, supra note 198, at 1140
(contending that the license grant in a software sale transaction is a promise by
the licensor that it will not sue as long as the licensee adheres to the stated
restrictions).
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and the inclusion of such a right does not remove the transaction
from the definition of a good under Article 9. 210
In connection with the purchase of a Nest device, Nest’s
EULA grants the licensee permission to execute one copy of the
device software for personal use for as long as the buyer owns
the product. 211 Nest expressly retains all intellectual property
rights in the software and the buyer is prohibited from selling,
assigning, distributing, copying or reverse engineering the
software. 212 Nest’s EULA also provides that certain aspects of
the product software may also be subject to open source software
licenses. 213 Despite this seeming complexity or dominance of
software in an IOT transaction, the inclusion of a software
license in connection with the sale of a device should not
automatically remove the transaction from the scope of Article
2 as restrictions under an EULA, such as Nest’s, could still be
enforced even if the transaction is subject to Article 2.
Additionally, “whether a particular transaction involving
computer software constitutes a ‘transaction in goods’ depends
on various considerations.” 214 In making such a determination,
courts often rely on the predominant purpose test. 215 The
application of the predominant purpose test is problematic in
the software context as it may also lead to varying results. 216
In Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Systems, 217 a case
involving a software development and license agreement, the
court reasoned that the predominant purpose of the transaction
was the transfer of intellectual property rights, and therefore

210. U.C.C. § 9-102(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
211. End User License Agreement, NEST, supra note 78.
212. See id. (stating that all copyrights, trade secrets, and other intellectual
property rights are exclusively the property of NEST and its licensors).
213. See id. (harmonizing the open source EULAs with its own).
214. Dealer Mgmt. Sys. v. Design Auto. Grp., Inc., 822 N.E.2d 556, 560 (2005).
215. See id. (noting the disagreement in this area, especially on the issue of
Article 2’s applicability to a transaction that involves software designed for a
specific purpose or to suit the needs of a specific buyer).
216. DOUGLAS J. WHALEY & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON COMMERCIAL LAW 32 (11th ed. 2016).
217. 935 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Article 2 did not apply. 218 In TK Power v. Textron, 219 the court
found that, although the contract called for the provision of
mechanical items and prototypes, most of the price paid under
the contract was for the developer’s “knowledge, skill, and
ability” to develop software code and test prototypes, and
therefore the contract was for services rather than goods. 220 In
Audio Visual Industry v. Tanzer, 221 the court reasoned that
Article 2 applied to a transaction involving the sale and
installation of a customized smart home system because the
predominant purpose of the transaction was for the sale of
goods. 222 The court compared the cost of the services to the cost
of the equipment, the nature of the seller’s business and the
intent of the parties. 223 Similarly, in Triangle Underwrites, Inc.
218. Id. at 433 (noting that the parties “bargained primarily for the right to
mass-market the product not for the right to install single copies of the display
driver onto their own PCs,” and the difference between a licensing agreement and
a mass-production agreement); see also Attachmate Corp. v. Health Net, Inc., NO.
C09-1161 MJP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114445 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 16, 2010)
(finding that the UCC did not apply to a breach of contract dispute involving an
end user licensing agreement as “the weight of authority favors application of
common law and not the UCC with regard to software licenses”).
219. 433 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
220. Id. at 1062.
221. 403 S.W.3d 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012).
222. See id. at 799–805 (examining the four factors of the predominant
purpose test and finding the installation services to be incidental to the actual
purpose of the transaction: selling an expensive smart home system).
223. See id. at 799–800 (focusing on the number of times the contract referred
to the sale of equipment, goods, and hardware). Other courts have also applied
the predominant purpose test to hybrid software transactions. See RRX Indus.,
Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985) (examining the contractual
significance of the sold software, training, systems repairs, and upgrades);
Surplus.com, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136254, at *8–11 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 23, 2010) (applying predominant purpose test and holding that Article 2
applies to a software development agreement); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech.
Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (N.D. Okla. 1997) (applying the predominant
purpose test and holding that Article 2 applied to an engineering software license
agreement); Camara v. Hill, 596 A.2d 349, 351 (Vt. 1991) (applying the test to a
contract for a computer system); USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc., 546
N.E.2d 888, 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (applying the predominant purpose test to
a contract to develop and install a turnkey computer system); Nelson Business
Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Del. 1987) (looking at the
predominant purpose of a lease contract for software, hardware, and services).
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v. Honeywell, Inc., 224 applying the predominant purpose test, the
court found that Article 2 applied to a transaction involving the
sale of a computer system consisting of “hardware, or the core
computer, printer, collator, and related equipment; ‘software,’
the designation for programming created for use in connection
with the hardware; standard programming aids; and ‘custom
application software’ specifically designed for [the plaintiff’s]
individual needs.” 225
Even if one believes that existing case law supports the
conclusion that Article 2 applies to the sale of IOT devices along
with the accompanying services and software, in cases applying
the predominant purpose test, “for the most part, courts state
the facts and then declare an answer, without providing an
analysis that is useful to other facts.” 226 This lack of clarity in
the case law, combined with the complex nature of IOT devices
that rely heavily on services and software provided and
maintained by companies, justifies movement towards a new
framework.
Software transactions involving the provision of support
services could also be viewed solely as service contracts,
particularly where software is not being delivered through a
physical medium or downloaded, but rather access is made
available only through a website. Such transactions are
typically governed by “Software as a Service Agreements” with
the software being provided through cloud computing. 227 In such
an instance, one could contend that the software is not movable
at the time of contracting and therefore does not meet the
definition of goods under Article 2. Software provided by IOT
manufacturers could be viewed as services because software
related to the function of the device may be provided through
224. 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
225. Id. at 738.
226. RUSH & SEPINUCK, supra note 120, at 4; see Braucher, supra note 203, at
244 (noting that courts applying Article 2 to software transactions routinely fail
to state whether they are applying Article 2 directly to the transaction or simply
using it as persuasive authority).
227. Holly K. Towle, Enough Already: It Is Time to Acknowledge that UCC
Article 2 Does Not Apply to Software and Other Information, 52 S. TEX. L. REV.
531, 547 (2011).
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cloud infrastructure. To the extent that IOT software is built
into IOT devices and buyers are downloading software updates
to their IOT devices, IOT hybrid transactions may be distinct
from standard “software as a service” transactions. However, as
previously noted, many IOT devices depend not only on software
embedded within the device to function but also on cloud
computing. 228
Where software transactions are accompanied by the
provision of services, at least one court has applied Article 2 to
a transaction where the services provided are not “substantially
different from those generally accompanying package sales of
computer system contracts,” such as installation, training, and
technical support services. 229 The services provided in
connection with the sale of IOT devices are distinct from these
types of traditional software services. Software installation,
training, and technical support services are frequently
performed by an individual rather than a device. 230 Goods may
be able to function even where an owner is not provided with
installation or training services. In contrast, IOT software
updates and online application services are often critical to the
functioning of IOT products. As discussed in Part I, the Revolv
IOT device was rendered inoperable after the manufacturer
elected to terminate all supporting services and software
updates.
As many courts have acknowledged, “[s]oftware is not
clearly a good or a service in the abstract, and may qualify as
either [a good or a service] depending on the particular
circumstances of the case.” 231 Most courts view transactions
228. David Linthicum, The Cloud and the Internet of Things Are Inseparable,
INFOWORLD (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.infoworld.com/ article/3021059/cloudcomputing/cloud-and-internet-of-things-are-inseparable. html (last visited Mar.
5, 2017) (predicting a significant increase in cloud-based device services) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
229. See generally Dahlmann v. Sulcus Hosp. Techs. Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 772
(E.D. Mich. 1999); Dealer Mgmt. Sys. v. Design Auto. Grp., Inc., 822 N.E.2d 556
(2005).
230. See Dealer Mgmt. Sys., 822 N.E.2d at 561 (“Contracts for the sale of
software often also involve the provision of services.”).
231. See Rottner v. AVG Techs. USA, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230 (D. Mass.
2013) (reasoning that Article 2 applied because the buyer was able to download
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involving the transfer of standardized software on a computer
disc as a transaction in goods. 232 Despite case law suggesting
that the transfer of standardized software qualifies as a good, in
the IOT context the services provided in connection with the sale
of the device complicate the analysis of whether Article 2 should
apply to such transactions.
Where an IOT transaction does not involve the sale of
standardized software but rather a corporate software
transaction, the provision of software and services may be even
more complex and the accompanying software that is specially
designed for the company could be viewed as a service and a
license rather than a sale of goods subject to Article 2. 233
Moreover, despite the increased dominance of software in
connection with the sale of devices, unlike software sold on a
computer disc, IOT devices are much more than the medium
through which software is provided. IOT devices are dynamic
objects built to actively interact with other devices, their
owners, and the environment, and to perform specific functions,
such as measuring consumption rates and purchasing goods on
behalf of their owners. 234 IOT products are also designed to
adapt to their environment to accommodate the needs of their
owners. 235
the software). But see Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29 n.13
(2d Cir. 2002) (noting that Article 2 may not apply to the licensing of software
that is downloadable from the internet).
232. See Rottner, 943 F. Supp. 2d at 230 (noting that most courts classify any
software package as a good).
233. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 19 cmt.(d) (1997) (“Under the
[U.C.C.] software that is mass-marketed is considered a good . . . . However,
software that was developed specifically for the customer is a service."); see also
Simulados Software, Ltd. v. Photon Infotech Private, Ltd. 40 F. Supp. 3d 1191,
1201 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (noting that many courts have “determined that certain
software transactions are better defined as services . . . Where software is
designed from scratch. . . the software is often found to be a service rather than a
good”); WHALEY & MCJOHN, supra note 216 (noting that whether Article 2 applies
to a transaction involving software is a thorny issue).
234. See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things,’
FORBES (May 13, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/
05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/#608dc89
a6828 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (explaining what IOT is and its many potential
applications) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
235. See id. (detailing the anticipatory nature of IOT devices).
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Given this level of interactivity, one could contend that IOT
devices are no different from video games—which are also
designed to interact with players. IOT technology is distinct
from traditional video games and it has enhanced the gaming
industry. The IOT
has fueled technological innovation in gaming and has
changed the way players used to play, now the games are
more interactive [and] use artificial intelligence . . . with
Tangible User Interface (TUI) i.e. the use of physical sensors
[which has led to the creation of] pervasive and mixed reality
games that ha[ve] smoothen[ed] [the] playing experience. 236

In the IOT setting multiple devices, such as smartphones,
tablets, and other IOT devices, are connected, and this permits
players to play, pause, and restart video games “on the go”
without the use of video consoles. 237 The makers of Wii and Xbox,
for example, are expected to leverage IOT technology to
“penetrate the traditional boundaries of gaming” and,
ultimately, take the gaming industry to the next level.” 238
Additionally, courts should be wary of analogizing IOT
devices to the sale of standardized software on computer discs.
Such similarities should not be the basis for applying Article 2
to a transaction. If developers of IOT devices begin to provide
software solely through cloud computing and software as a
service contracts, the software is no longer on a medium—the
IOT device. As a result, these transactions would not be subject
to Article 2 under the computer-disc medium rationale.

236. Ashish Mahendra, How the Internet of Things Revolutionizes the Gaming
Industry, IOTWORM (Nov. 22, 2015), http://iotworm.com/internet-of-thingschanges-gaming-industry/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
237. See generally Deendayal Choudhary, Ganesh Kutty, Kaustubh
Deshpande, Rechana Nadar & Sumit A. Hirve, Internet of Things—Changing The
Game, 12 INT’L J. SCI. & TECH. RES. 238 (2015).
238. Mahendra, supra note 236.
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D. Software and Other Sources of Law

The ALI and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (ULC) first attempted to address software
transactions via Article 2B of the UCC. 239 This proposed revision
to the UCC subsequently became UCITA after the ALI withdrew
from the project. 240
UCITA, a proposed uniform law, applies to computer
information transactions. 241 The official comments to UCITA
suggest that the model law adopts a gravamen of the action
standard with respect to transactions involving goods and
computer information. 242 UCITA may also apply to software
transferred with goods where the goods are a computer or a
computer peripheral. 243 As Professors Koopman and Kaner have
noted, Internet-enabled goods may qualify as computer
peripherals under UCITA because they are connected to a
239. See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, What’s Software Got To
Do with It? The ALI Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 84 TUL. L. REV.
1541, 1544 (2010) (providing the history of the ALI’s work in this area).
240. Id. at 1543.
241. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 103(a) (2002).
Certain transactions are excluded from the scope of the model law, such as
financial services and insurance transactions, a motion picture or audio or visual
programming
other than a mass-market transaction or a submission of an idea or
information or release of informational rights that may result in
making a motion picture or similar information product; or a sound
recording, musical work, phonorecord or an enhanced sound recording,
other than in the submission of an idea or information or release of
informational rights that may result in the creation of such material
or a similar information product.
Id. § 103(d).
242. Id. § 103 cmt. 4(b)(1) (noting that the law applicable to an issue depends
on whether the issue pertains to goods or computer information and UCITA
applies only to the computer information portion of the hybrid transaction, while
Article 2 applies to the goods aspect of the transaction). See also id. § 103(b)(1)
(2002); id. § 103 cmt. 4(b)(3). However, the comments to UCITA also refer to a
heightened version of the predominant purpose test for other types of mixed
transactions. Id. § 103 cmt. 4(c).
243. Id. § 103(b)(1)(a). UCITA can also cover transactions involving goods
and computer information where “giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access
to or use of the program is ordinarily a material purpose of transactions in goods
of the type sold or leased.” Id. § 103(b)(1)(B).
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computer either directly or indirectly via a network. 244 However,
UCITA’s impact on IOT transactions involving computer
information is limited as it has not been broadly adopted by
states and some states have enacted shelter provisions to
prevent application of the act. 245 Although UCITA contains
provisions regarding a right of return that may be applicable in
specific circumstances in mass-market license transactions, the
model law has faced significant opposition from consumer
protection advocates. 246 Additionally, the official comments to
UCITA suggest that its coverage does not extend to software
embedded within goods where “the embedded program is a mere
part of the goods.” 247 Software is likely to be routinely embedded
within IOT devices and one could certainly contend that the
software embedded within such devices is an indistinguishable
part of the device.
244. PHILIP KOOPMAN & CEM KANER, THE PROBLEM OF EMBEDDED SOFTWARE IN
UCITA
AND
DRAFTS
OF
REVISED
ARTICLE
2
(2001),
http://kaner.com/pdfs/embedd1.pdf (explaining that Internet-enabled household
appliances could qualify as computer peripherals, due to the difficulty of defining
computer peripherals in a practical manner); see also Cem Kaner, Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act: Software Engineering and UCITA, 18 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 435, 525 (1999) (stating that “if a copy of a
program is contained in and sold or leased as part of a computer or computer
peripheral . . . then the program is within the scope of UCITA under section
103(b) and the vendor can bring the whole transaction . . . under UCITA”). But
see Linda Rusch, Is the Saga of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Revisions
Over? A Brief Look at What NCCUSL Finally Approved, 6 DEL. L. REV. 41, 45
(2003) (suggesting that smart goods are not computer peripherals).
245. Elvy, supra note 19, at 887. To date, only Maryland and Virginia have
adopted the UCITA. Legislative Fact Sheet—Computer Information Transactions
Act, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Legislative Fact
Sheet.aspx?title=Computer%20Information%20Transactions%20Act (last visited
Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also IOWA
CODE § 554D.104 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 66-313 (2015); W. VA. CODE § 39A-1-1
(2015).
246. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 209(b) (2002). See
generally Robert Oakley, Fairness in Electronic Contracting: Minimum
Standards for Non-Negotiated Contracts, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1041, 1073 (2005).
247. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 103 cmt. 4(b)(3)
(2002) (“[UCITA] does not apply to a copy of a program on a computer chip
embedded as part of an automobile engine and sold or leased as an
indistinguishable part of the automobile containing the engine. On the other
hand, [UCITA] does apply to a copy of a program contained on a computer chip in
a computer and transferred along with the computer.”).
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The Software Principles represent the ALI’s second effort to
unify the law of software agreements. Proponents of the
Software Principles have argued that software transactions are
different from transfers of goods and therefore, Article 2 and the
common-law are not equipped to address such transactions. 248
As previously noted, the software embedded within an IOT
device is likely to be governed by an EULA. 249 The Software
Principles apply to software agreements supported by
consideration, including licenses, sales, and access contracts,
and it provides that contract formation issues should be
evaluated by using a reasonableness standard. 250
The Software Principles provide that a software agreement
term is unenforceable where it conflicts with a mandatory rule
or the purposes and policies of intellectual property law, or
would constitute misuse in an infringement proceeding. 251
Further, to protect buyers in transactions involving the
purchase of defective software, the Software Principles provide
for an implied warranty of no material hidden defects that
cannot be disclaimed. 252 The warranty is based on the duty of
good faith, the duty to disclose, and fraudulent-concealment
law. 253 In consumer agreements and standard form transfers of
generally available software, the Software Principles prohibit a
transferor from disabling the software as a remedy for breach of

248. See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer, Through the Looking Glass: What Courts
and UCITA Say About the Scope of Contract Law in the Information Age, 38 DUQ.
L. REV. 255, 257–58 (2000) (arguing that neither Article 2 nor the common law
are suited to regulate software transactions).
249. Terms of Service, NEST, supra note 76. Nest users are subject to an EULA
for software associated with Nest devices. Id.
250. SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, §§ 1.06(a), 2.02.
251. See id. § 1.09 (providing for the consideration of intellectual property
law).
252. See id. § 3.05(b) (prohibiting implied warranty of no material hidden
defects from being disclaimed); see also Robert Hillman, Contract Law in Context:
The Case of Software Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669, 677 (2010)
(discussing the nondisclaimable warranty of no hidden material defects of which
the transferor is aware).
253. See SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 3.05 cmt. b. (detailing the
warranty’s foundational principles and legal authority).
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the agreement regardless of whether the contract contains a
conspicuous automatic disabling provision. 254
Despite the potential protections provided to transferees
under the Software Principles, the application of the Software
Principles to hybrid IOT transactions is questionable. First, the
Software Principles are soft law, which courts and parties are
free to ignore. 255 Second, the Software Principles exclude the
transfer of disks, CD-ROMs, “or other tangible medium that
stores the software” and embedded software in goods where the
predominant purpose of the transaction is for the sale of goods
rather than software. 256 As discussed in Part III.A above, while
hybrid IOT transactions are distinct from contracts involving
the transfer of software on computer discs, software is
frequently built into IOT devices.
To the extent that software is embedded within an IOT
device and a court concludes that the predominant purpose of
the transaction is for the transfer of software rather than goods,
the Software Principles may apply to the transaction. 257 With a
few exceptions, the comments of the Software Principles
indicate that the factors that courts have used in the Article 2
context to apply the predominant purpose test should also be
used in deciding the Software Principles’ applicability to hybrid
software transactions. 258 As with the traditional predominant
254. Id. § 4.03(c), (d); see also Hillman, supra note 252, at 675 (noting that the
Software Principles “balance the interests of transferors and transferees and
authorize automated disablement in limited circumstances and only after
receiving court authorization”). But see SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44,
§ 4.03(d) (noting that automated disablement is permitted in certain instances).
255. Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, The Exportability of the
Principles of Software: Lost in Translation?, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 25, 43–
44 (2009).
256. SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, §§ 1.06(b)–1.08; see also Hillman,
supra note 252, at 673 (noting that the Software Principles exclude embedded
software unless, measured objectively, the predominant purpose of the transferee
is to obtain the software).
257. See SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 1.07(a) (excluding embedded
software unless the predominant purpose of the transferee is to obtain the
software).
258. See id. § 1.07 cmt. b (listing language of the agreement; nature of goods;
price of goods; nature of parties’ bargaining; ease of copying and transferring;
general availability of the software; whether there is a separate price for the
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purpose test, no specific factor is controlling under the Software
Principles. Where non-embedded software is provided along
with “any combination of goods, digital content and services,”
the Software Principles suggest that it applies to the software
aspect of the transaction “unless the services or digital content
predominate.” 259 The Software Principles’ retention of the
predominant purpose test to assess its applicability to hybrid
transactions involving the sale of goods and software is
problematic given the deficiencies of the predominant purpose
test noted in Part III.A above.
The ALI has described the purpose of the Software
Principles as aimed at describing the law of software contracts
as it should be. 260 The Software Principles have been criticized
for failing to provide clear guidance on distinguishing between
a license and a sale while addressing generic issues, such as
unconscionability. 261
The Software Principles have also been criticized for failing
to clearly cover digital content. 262 As Professor Kim notes,
software is often viewed as a subset of digital content and
“digital content is often bundled with embedded software in
software; and whether the transferor developed the software for the particular
transferee or product as factors).
259. Id. at 1–2 Summary Overview, § 1.07 cmt. d, § 1.08.
260. See id § 1.07 cmt. B (criticizing and rejecting UCITA’s material purpose
test).
261. See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 239, at 1546–47 (questioning the
reasons for leaving out such guidance in light of the work’s aspirational nature).
262. See Nancy S. Kim, Expanding the Scope of the Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts to Include Digital Content, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1595, 1595 (2010)
[hereinafter Kim, Expanding the Scope] (contending that the Software Principles
should encompass digital content because distinguishing digital content from
software may be difficult for courts and the exclusion of such content fails to
resolve the conundrum of how to balance the proprietary rights and interests of
licensor-owners and the rights and interests of licensee-consumers). The Software
Principles define digital content as “digital art,” which is “literary and artistic
information stored electronically, such as music, photographs, motion pictures,
books, newspapers, and other images and sounds,” and “digital database,” which
is a “compilation of facts arranged in a systematic manner and stored
electronically.” SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 1.01(f)(2). The
predominant purpose test also applies to hybrid transactions involving digital
content and software. Id. § 108.
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multimedia products.” 263 As a result, it may be difficult for
courts to distinguish between digital content and software. 264
This problem may be exacerbated as disruptive IOT technology
becomes ubiquitous and digital content is more easily integrated
with software and IOT devices. The Software Principles also
provide a safe harbor provision that upholds electronic form
contracts and binds transferees where a transferee has
reasonable notice of and access to contract terms prior to
payment, and indicates agreement to the terms at the end of or
adjacent to the electronic form contract, among other things. 265
This standard likely validates clickwrap agreements. 266 As I
have argued elsewhere, restrictive notions of notice and an
opportunity to review are inadequate for consumer IOT
contracts. 267
A consumer who owns an IOT device may be provided with
what is arguably reasonable notice of contract terms prior to
associating or registering the device to purchase goods and
supplying credit card information to enable the device to place
subsequent orders on their behalf. 268 Terms of use may also be
supplied to a consumer upon establishing an account with a
retailer or a link may be provided to the conditions of use
263. Kim, Expanding the Scope, supra note 262, at 1603–06.
264. See id. at 1595–96, 1603–04 (arguing that consumers do not distinguish
between digital content and software). For instance, “while a reader may
distinguish a Kindle from an e-book, he or she probably does not think about the
words separately from the software that enables the words to be displayed.” Id.
at 1604.
265. SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 2.02(c).
266. In a clickwrap agreement, a buyer is required to click an “I agree” button
after the terms of the agreement are disclosed. RUSCH & SEPINUCK, supra note
120, at 60.
267. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 846–49 (contending that high levels of
information asymmetry and contract distancing should be considered when
evaluating consumer assent to contract terms in the IOT setting). Other scholars
have also highlighted concerns with the use of one-sided legal provisions in
consumer contracts in the non-IOT context. See, e.g., Amy Schmitz, Access to
Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 279, 281
(2012) (discussing the ways in which companies “capitalize on continued freedom
to impose fees and one-sided contract terms” on uninformed consumers).
268. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 852 (describing the general characteristics
and functions of IOT devices).
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whenever a consumer proceeds through the login process.
However, a consumer may not be provided with contract terms
or even amended contract terms prior to the device placing a
sixth or seventh order for goods, and a consumer may not always
be required to access hyperlinks containing the terms and
conditions as part of the login process. 269 Because the consumer
was given reasonable notice of the contract terms prior to
registering the device to place orders, the consumer could be
bound to provisions that are detrimental to his or her ability to
seek legal redress. 270 This standard does not adequately address
the failure of consumers to read and understand contract terms,
which continues to be a pressing problem. 271 Consider that
Amazon’s DRS terms and conditions provide that its liability for
each claim is limited to fifty dollars. 272 Further, IOT devices
allow consumers to mindlessly purchase goods without
reflection, thereby increasing the ease with which consumers
can become further indebted to credit card companies and other
creditors. 273
IV. Proposals
The goals of substantive uniformity, clarity, and simplicity
are central to the UCC. 274 One of the central aims of the ULC
269. See id. at 844 (“The consumer is not required to access the company’s
website or mobile application (which contains contract terms), review the
company’s terms or conditions, or click an ‘I agree’ button before each subsequent
order is placed.”).
270. See id. at 879 (noting that courts may infer a consumer’s notice of
contract terms because the terms may have been provided when the IOT device
was first activated).
271. See id. at 874 (citing statistics from multiple cases and studies which
show that consumers routinely fail to read contract terms).
272. See Amazon Dash Replenishment Terms of Use, supra note 57 (“IN NO
EVENT WILL OUR OR OUR LICENSORS’ AGGREGATE LIABILITY UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM EXCEED FIFTY
DOLLARS ($50.00).”).
273. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 878 (explaining how mindless purchasing
further distances consumers from contract terms). My future scholarship in this
area will continue to explore the relationship between automated consumer debt
and the new IOT contracting environment.
274. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002)
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was to encourage states to enact uniform acts to prevent federal
intervention in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Swift v. Tyson. 275 In 1945, the ALI began working with the ULC
to draft the UCC in an effort to eliminate previous piecemeal
adoption of uniform legislation by states. 276 By 1975, the UCC
had been adopted in every American state with Louisiana
adopting only specific articles of the UCC. 277
Given the potential imperfections in state processes for
adoption and enforcement of the UCC, the use of local
amendment to vary the text of the UCC, and a lack of clarity or
silence in the UCC in some areas, the goal of uniformity has
proved to be elusive. 278 Article 2’s failure to provide explicit
guidance on how best to handle hybrid transactions involving
goods, services, or software is one such area in which a lack of
harmony and uniformity continues to be rampant and is likely
to be problematic in the age of the IOT. Rather than achieving
substantive uniformity among states, the UCC has instead
facilitated consensus on certain important commercial law
issues, a laudable but different goal from the one envisioned by
the drafters of the UCC. 279
The lack of clarity in UCC case law on how to evaluate
hybrid transactions and the potential limited application of
common-law warranties, UCITA, and the Software Principles
indicate that a new framework in this area is needed. Courts
(enumerating the underlying purpose and policies of the U.C.C.).
275. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 529 (pointing to concern over the Supreme
Court’s decision in Swift to apply the general law of commerce rather than state
law in commercial law cases); see also Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 12 (1842)
(“Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled
to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of this court; but
they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our own
judgments are to be bound up and governed.”), overruled by Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
276. See Taylor, supra note 3, at 530 (“The sponsor hoped through
consolidation to sell the whole package to the various states and thus avoid some
of the ‘picking and choosing’ in which the states had engaged with earlier uniform
acts.”).
277. Id. at 531.
278. See id. (summarizing the various factors that led to a lack of uniformity
by states in applying the Uniform Commercial Code).
279. See id. at 531 (“[L]ikeness rather than exactness—harmony rather than
uniformity—has been the history of the ‘Uniform’ Commercial Code . . . .”).
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should abandon the predominant purpose test which has led to
conflicting decisions in cases involving similar facts. Four
potential proposals for increasing clarity and uniformity in this
area include: (1) expanding the scope of Article 2 to cover
transactions involving “products,” (2) adopting a functionality
test that evaluates the relationship between the goods, software,
and services, (3) adopting Article 9’s definition of goods, and
(4) excluding such transactions from the scope of Article 2. The
remainder of this section evaluates the efficacy and potential
drawbacks of each proposal. The Article concludes by calling for
the adoption of the functionality approach.
A. Products Approach
One approach to improving clarity in assessing hybrid
transactions is to widen the scope of Article 2 to cover not only
transactions in goods, but also transactions involving products.
This would include the hardware of IOT devices, embedded
software, software updates, and other related services and
software provided by a retailer or manufacturer. Under this
approach, a seller and a buyer of an IOT device will know in
advance that the entire transaction, including the software and
the services, will be subject to Article 2. This avoids unnecessary
litigation about Article 2’s applicability to such transactions.
Other provisions of Article 2 which may arguably be limited to
a contract for the sale of goods may also need to be amended to
give full effect to this solution.
The IOT is expected to usher in an era in which almost every
movable item can be designed with “electronics, software and
sensors and connectivity that allow these objects to collect and
exchange data.” 280 Further, the industrial IOT will transform
manufacturing goods into “systems of intelligence.” 281 General
Electric estimates that by 2020 revenues from the industrial
280. Tim Maverick, The Future of the Industrial Internet of Things, TREFIS
(May 6, 2016), http://www.trefis.com/stock/spy/articles/354034/the-future-of-theindustrial-internet-of-things/2016-05-06 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
281. Id.
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IOT will be $225 billion and $170 billion for the consumer
IOT. 282 Goods will cease to be the static objects that Article 2
was drafted to initially cover. The services and software
provided by manufacturers and retailers in connection with the
transfer of an IOT device allow these devices to operate as goods.
In other words, but for the service and the related software,
there would be no good. The sale of an IOT device is much more
than a simple transfer of moveable hardware from seller to
buyer. Such an agreement involves a complex transaction
comprising of the transfer of hardware, embedded software, and
the expected provision of ongoing services and software updates.
If all goods are now Internet-enabled and are accompanied by
ongoing services and software, limiting Article 2’s scope to the
static goods of the pre-information era simply fails to consider
this new reality.
There are potential concerns with expanding Article 2’s
scope to cover transactions involving “products.” First, one could
argue that Article 2 is not the best body of law to govern disputes
involving IOT transactions. Article 2 does not clearly address all
issues related to software transactions, such as the role of
federal intellectual property law 283 and the distinction between
the license and sale of software. 284 However, the application of
Article 2 to an IOT transaction does not prevent the application
of federal intellectual property law. Transactions involving
software embedded within goods are less likely to raise
intellectual property issues regarding “copying, transfer,
support, maintenance, upgrade, inspection, monitoring,
282. See id. (noting that venture investment into industrial IOT has grown by
76% to over $1 billion).
283. See David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, The
Metamporphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17, 19 (1999)
(examining the later-rejected Article 2B of the U.C.C. and federal copyright law).
The subsequent sale of an IOT device from one consumer to another may also
raise interesting intellectual property, questions and my future work in this area
will explore such issues.
284. See Abby J. Hardwick, Note, Amending the Uniform Commercial Code:
How Will a Change in Scope Alter the Concept of Goods?, 82 WASH. U. L. REV. 275,
285 (2004) (recognizing the Business Software Alliance’s proposal to draft a new
U.C.C. article to govern software contracts given that computer information
generally takes the form of a conferred license).
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licensing restrictions, or remedial limitations (in any way
distinct from the goods themselves).” 285 Software prebuilt into
goods may be more difficult to copy and interoperability issues
in the IOT setting may prevent any such software from being
freely copied, transferred, and used in another brand or type of
goods. 286 Additionally, given UCITA’s limited reach and the
soft-law status of the Software Principles, Article 2 remains the
better alternative.
Second, the adoption of such an expansive approach could
result in Article 2 applying to every aspect of a hybrid
transaction even if the predominant purpose of the transaction
is not for the sale of goods but for the provision of services or
software. This arguably contradicts section 2-102, which limits
Article 2’s application to transactions in goods. 287 Automatic
application of Article 2 to a hybrid transaction may be
detrimental to purchasers in some instances. Article 2 imposes
a four-year statute of limitations, which may be shorter than the
period applicable under other sources of law, and permits
parties to reduce the limitations period to not less than one
year. 288 Additionally, many of Article 2’s provisions can be
285. Robert Hillman, Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 2010 A.L.I.
1, 2.
286. See id. (“[E]mbedded software typically is difficult to copy and specialpurpose in nature . . . .”).
287. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
288. Id. § 2-725. A cause of action generally accrues when the breach occurs
regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach and a breach
of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made. Id. § 2-725(2). However, if
the seller’s warranty explicitly extends to the future performance of the good and
discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance, the cause of
action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. Id. Article 2
explicitly preserves tolling of the statute of limitations. Id. § 2-725(4). In
Perlmutter v. Don’s Ford, Inc., the court held that Article 2 did not apply to the
transaction and as such a six-year statute of limitations applied to the
transaction. See generally 409 N.Y.S.2d 628 (City Ct. 1978) (determining that the
four-year Statute of Limitations under § 2-725 of the U.C.C. did not apply).
Additionally, a seller’s statute of fraud defense, as well as risk of loss rules, may
be detrimental to a buyers’ claim. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 136, at
164. While other sources of law, including the common law, may uphold contracts
that reduce the statute of limitations, some courts have imposed a reasonableness
requirement in evaluating the validity of such contracts in the non-Article 2
context. See Beck v. General Ins. Co.,18 P.2d 579, 583 (Or. 1933) (finding that
“there is nothing in the policy [of statutes of limitation] or object of such statutes

HYBRID TRANSACTIONS

147

varied by contract. If Article 2 applies to the hybrid transaction,
sellers would still be permitted under Article 2 to disclaim
implied warranties and extend express warranties only to the
device and not to the services or software. 289 To address this
concern, the Warranty Act’s approach, which prevents the
disclaimer of implied warranties where a written warranty has
been provided, could be adopted. 290
I have argued elsewhere that there are specific areas of
Article 2 that are in need of improvement in the IOT setting, and
I have proposed amendments to Article 2 to alleviate these
concerns. 291 However, in the absence of a statute that is designed
to address the sale of IOT products consisting of a device and
ongoing online services and software, Article 2 is perhaps the
most sensible alternative. Article 2 is the main uniform body of
state law currently available to address transactions in goods.
Third, rather than Article 2 applying to the entire
transaction, one could posit that it is best to apply multiple and
separate sources of law that are designed to address specific
aspects of IOT hybrid transactions. Following this line of
reasoning, Article 2 and the Warranty Act could apply to the sale
of the device’s hardware, while the common law and the
Warranty Act govern the service agreement, 292 and the Software
Principles, the common law or UCITA, and intellectual property
law apply to the EULA. This approach is similar to the
component test, where Article 2 is applied only to the goods
aspect of the transaction. 293 However, consider a consumer who
which forbids the parties to an agreement to provide a shorter period, provided
the time is not unreasonably short”).
289. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (outlining
available exclusions and modifications to warranties).
290. See
Magnuson-Moss
Warranty–Federal
Trade
Commission
Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 108(A), 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (2012)) (“No supplier may disclaim or modify . . . any implied
warranty to a consumer with respect to such consumer product if (1) such supplier
makes any written warranty to the consumer with respect to such consumer
product . . . .”).
291. See generally Elvy, supra note 19.
292. Depending, of course, on whether the service agreement qualifies as a
service contract under the Warranty Act.
293. See generally supra note 135.
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has purchased an IOT device who discovers that, in order to use
the device as advertised by the manufacturer or retailer, she will
be subject to three separate contracts that are governed by four
or five different sources of law. As I have noted elsewhere,
consumers frequently fail to read and understand contract
terms. 294 Thus, consumers are unlikely to spend time attempting
to understand three separate contracts and the many distinct
sources of law that may govern their rights under each contract.
Application of this approach would lead to more than one source
of law governing a hybrid transaction and this could present
insurmountable problems of proof in determining how to apply
different rules of damages. 295
B. Functionality Approach
Alternatively, a functionality test could be adopted to assess
whether hybrid IOT transactions fall within the scope of Article
2. In IOT hybrid transactions, the services and software are no
longer “merely incidental to the sale of [the] goods.” 296 Rather,
the software and services constitute an integral part of the
device’s operations as evidenced by the Revolv smart hub’s lack
of functionality after services were terminated by the company
as discussed in Part I above. 297 Similarly, glitches in the
required automatic software updates for the Nest Learning
Thermostat have left “the thermostat unresponsive, unable to
control heating systems and often drained of all power.” 298
294. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 874 (“Consumers routinely fail to read
contract terms.”)
295. See Hudson v. Town & Country True Value Hardware, Inc., 666 S.W.2d
51, 54 (Tenn. 1984) (“[T]he majority of sales . . . consisting of both goods and nongoods, would present difficult and in some instances insurmountable problems of
proof in segregating assets and determining their respective values at the time of
the original contract and . . . resale, in order to apply two different measures of
damages”); see also Brush, supra note 124, at 14–16.
296. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc. 604 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir.
1979).
297. Supra Part I.
298. Iain Thomson, Nest Thermostat Owners Out in the Cold After Software
(Jan.
14,
2016,
12:17
AM),
Update
Cockup,
REGISTER
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/01/14/nest_foul_up/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017)
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Under a functionality approach, where the functionality of
the IOT device depends on the provision of services and software
to be supplied by the manufacturer or retailer, Article 2 would
apply to the entire transaction. If a manufacturer or retailer has
advertised the device as being able to perform certain functions
and ongoing services, and software updates are needed in order
for a purchaser to use all aspects of the device, the transaction
should be subject to Article 2. Even where an agreement is
labeled as a license of software or services, if the software and
services are tied to the operations of the device, Article 2 should
govern the related dispute.
Conversely, if a buyer can use all features of the device as
advertised by the manufacturer or retailer without the provision
of services and software, then Article 2 would apply only to the
goods portion of the transaction. This is likely to be rare in the
IOT setting. In such an event, different sources of law could
apply to the transaction, resulting in a similar problem
discussed in Part IV.A above. 299 However, the functionality
approach more adequately captures the ways in which IOT
devices are used and advertised.
In applying the functionality test, courts would evaluate
how a device is advertised to buyers by the manufacturer and
retailer as well as how integral the services and software are to
the operations of the device.
One could argue that the adoption of such a singular
approach to hybrid transactions is not preferable. Given the
expected evolution of the IOT, it is perhaps beneficial for states
and courts to serve as laboratories for experimentation that
would generate multiple solutions allowing for the identification
of the best approach to dealing with hybrid transactions.
However, since the adoption of Article 2, courts have struggled
to evaluate hybrid transactions and decades later only two major
alternatives have been offered: the predominant purpose test
and the gravamen of the claim test. 300 Both of these approaches
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Software glitches have also
led to freezing homes and fear of burst water mains. Id.
299. Supra Part IV.A.
300. Supra Parts III.A.1–2.
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are problematic as discussed in Part III. 301 Uniformity of the law
among various jurisdictions is one of the central underlying
policies of the UCC, and resolving this ambiguity in Article 2 via
the adoption of a singular approach, which considers the unique
manner in which services and software are provided in
connection with the sale of IOT devices, furthers this important
goal.
1. Functionality Approach vs. Predominant Purpose Test
Another potential critique of the functionality test is that
this approach is no different from the predominant purpose test.
However, the functionality approach avoids many of the
drawbacks of the predominant purpose test.
First, because the predominant purpose test considers the
parties’ purpose for entering into the transaction and the terms
of the contract, including the label given to the contract by the
parties, either party can easily mold their arguments to satisfy
the factors of the test. An analysis of the parties’ main objective
for entering into the underlying transaction likely requires
testimony from the parties regarding their reasons for
contracting. A buyer could easily claim that its predominant
purpose for entering into the transaction was for the purchase
of goods rather than services or software. Conversely, a seller
could simply label all aspects of a hybrid IOT transaction,
including the various contracts, as a license rather than a sale.
Cable companies routinely lease rather than sell cable boxes to
consumers and these rental fees total approximately $19.5
billion in revenue annually. 302 IOT manufacturers could elect to
301. Supra Parts III.A.1–2.
302. See Markey, Blumenthal Decry Lack of Choice, Competition in Pay-TV
Video Box Marketplace, ED MARKEY, UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR MASSACHUSETTS
(July 30, 2015) http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/markeyblumenthal-decry-lack-of-choice-competition-in-pay-tv-video-box-marketplace
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (remarking that approximately ninety-nine percent of
customers rent their cable box) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The Federal Communications Commission has proposed new “set-topbox” rules that would force providers to open their services to other companies.
See Anthony Wood, How the FCC’s ‘Set-Top Box’ Rule Hurts Consumers, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 21, 2016, 7:05 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-fccs-set-top-box-
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do the same. Where IOT devices routinely collect data about
buyers, courts should be wary of permitting companies to label
transactions as a license or lease rather than a sale as this could
remove the transaction from Article 2’s scope.
A party with superior bargaining power could also include
additional contract language to indicate that the transaction is
for the provision of services rather than goods. A seller may also
easily contend that, in the IOT setting, the services and software
provided by manufacturers and retailers are more valuable to
buyers entering into an IOT transaction. As discussed in Part II
above, a buyer may elect to purchase an IOT device because of
the convenient services provided in connection with the sale of
the device. 303 While intending to transfer title of the physical
device to the buyer, a seller of such a device is unlikely to
contemplate granting the buyer title to the software or services
accompanying such a device.
While the functionality test does not ignore the goals of the
parties or the expectations of the buyer, this method inserts
objectivity into the analysis. The functionality approach
evaluates the role of the services and software in the operations
of the device and, where the services and software are integral
to the operations of the device, they should be viewed as part of
the goods and the transaction should be subject to Article 2. If
necessary, parties could easily submit evidence regarding
advertising materials and the device’s operations including its
hardware, software, digital content, ancillary updates and
services.
The functionality approach eliminates the need for the
nuanced, varied, and tedious inquiries performed by courts in
applying the predominant purpose test, such as a comparison of
the costs of the services and goods, and the nature of the seller’s
rule-hurts-consumers-1461279906 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (commenting on
potential implications of the Federal Communication Commission’s “set-top-box”
rules) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also FCC, PROPOSAL
TO UNLOCK THE SET-TOP BOX (2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attach
match/DOC-337449 A1.pdf (“Since 1994 . . . the cost of cable set-top-boxes has
risen 185 percent while the cost of computers, televisions, and mobile phones has
dropped by 90 percent.”).
303. Supra Part II.
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business. Additionally, under the predominant purpose test, the
expectation of the buyer is one of many factors that courts may
evaluate and courts do not provide guidance on which specific
factor should be more heavily considered as discussed in Part III
above. 304 The functionality method avoids the pitfalls of the
excessive multifactor approach of the predominant purpose test.
Second, although the functionality approach considers the
manner in which the IOT device was advertised to buyers,
products must be advertised to attract buyers. Currently, IOT
manufacturers frequently advertise all features of IOT
devices. 305 In explaining the convenience of such devices, the
benefits of the embedded software and software updates that
permit the performance of certain functions and the
accompanying services are routinely described to purchasers. 306
Buyers have become accustomed to and expect this level of
specificity in advertising. It is unlikely that retailers or
manufacturers will mold their advertising materials to meet the
requirements of the functionality test in an effort to avoid the
application of Article 2.
Further, because the functionality approach evaluates the
operations of the device even if manufacturers were tempted to
manipulate advertising materials, the composition and
operations of the device speaks for itself. Legal prohibitions on
false and deceptive advertising should also serve as a deterrent
to any such manipulation. 307 In short, the functionality test does
not require courts to evaluate multiple vague factors and the
functionality test is less susceptible to manipulation by the
parties.
304. Supra Part III.
305. See Meet the Nest Thermostat, NEST, https://nest.com/thermostat/meetnest-thermostat/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (marketing the varying features of
Nest thermostats) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
306. See id. (focusing on the thermostat’s ability to collect data about the
user’s habits).
307. See 15 U.S.C. § 52(a) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for any person,
partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false
advertisement . . . .”). Additionally, section 2-102 of the UCC provides that the
provisions of Article 2 are not intended to impair or repeal any statute regulating
sales to consumers. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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Moreover, a functionality test sufficiently accounts for the
types of devices that are generated by the IOT—devices that are
Internet-enabled and sold with the assumption that services and
software will be needed for the device to properly function.
Historically, when goods were accompanied by services, the
services were severable or divisible from the operation of the
goods. 308 The predominant purpose approach, the gravamen of
the claim approach and even the component test presume that
the services can be separated from the goods. 309
In the IOT setting, networks, systems, devices, companies
and individuals are all connected, goods are frequently
embedded with software, and services are provided through the
devices to promote this interconnectivity. Divisibility ceases to
exist or at the very least decreases significantly. The services
and software are no longer easily severable from the operation
of the goods. Further, where a plaintiff alleges economic loss
because an IOT device or its accompanying software
malfunctions such claims should be heard under Article 2.
2. Functionality Approach vs. Products Approach
An additional possible criticism of the functionality
approach is that it is identical to the products approach.
Manufacturers include software in goods to serve a purpose and
software will frequently be connected to the operations of a
device. Following this line of reasoning, under the functionality
test all devices containing software would be subject to Article
2—which is similar to the result obtained under the products
approach. 310 One potential response to this critique is that not
all software, or software upgrades for that matter, are needed in
order for a device to function.
The monetization of software in the IOT setting presents
one such example. Consider that, in 2015, Tesla announced a
software upgrade to increase the high speed auto-pilot
308.
309.
310.

Supra Part III.
Supra Part III.
Supra Part IV.A.
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capabilities of its cars—the Model S—for a cost of $2,500. 311 The
Tesla vehicle could continue to function without the upgrade at
the time of contracting because it was an optional feature
provided by the company. Similarly, installation and training
services which may be provided by an IOT manufacturer are not
always central to a device’s operations.
3. Cybersecurity and Warranties
Where the functionality of the device depends on the
software and services provided by the manufacturer and—as a
result of the provision of these products—companies are able to
collect and retain data about owners, companies collecting and
using this information should be obligated to secure the data
and the device. There are no uniform rules governing data
breach disputes because states have adopted varying laws on
this issue. 312 For companies doing business in multiple states
“the different and confounding state laws make responding to a
data breach in an appropriate, timely and compliant fashion
very difficult.” 313

311. See Aaron M. Kessler, Tesla Adds High-Speed Autonomous Driving to Its
Bag of Tricks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
10/16/automobiles/tesla-adds-high-speed-autono
mous-driving-to-its-bag-oftricks.html? (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“It is the first time that a production
vehicle available to consumers will have such advanced self-driving capabilities.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
312. Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving Efficiency
Through a State-Informed Federal Data Breach Notification and Data Protection
Law, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45, 52 (2015) (describing how the scattered
approach to addressing privacy has prompted gap filling by states); see also Kevin
L. Miller, What We Talk About When We Talk About “Reasonable Cybersecurity”:
A Proactive and Adaptive Approach, FLA. B.J., Sept.–Oct. 2016, at 23 (contending
that the “current U.S. legal framework for cybersecurity is a patchwork,
consisting of a number of overlapping federal standards aimed at regulated
entities in various sectors, state cyber-breach notification laws, state statutes,
and case law arising from consumer’s actions against companies”).
313. Stephen Embry, State Data Breach Notification Law Just Got Crazier, L.
TECH. TODAY, (Apr. 19, 2016) http://www.lawtechnologytoday.org/2016/04/ crazyquilt-work-state-data-breach-notification-laws-just-got-crazier/ (last visited Mar.
5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Article 2 should play an important role in data breach cases
and lawsuits involving insecure IOT devices, particularly where
a company provides an IOT device that is vulnerable to intrusion
or where a company fails to provide adequate security for the
data collected by the device and online services accompanying
the device. In such instances, consumer owners of IOT devices
should have a cause of action for breach of implied warranties
under Article 2. Companies may also need to consider clearly
informing consumers about the extent to which services,
security patches and software updates will be provided during
the life-cycle of the device.
Under the implied warranty of merchantability, goods that
are sold by merchants who deal in goods of that kind must be fit
for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. 314 The
implied warranty of merchantability arises in a contract for sale,
and software is normally licensed rather than sold. 315 Thus, in a
hybrid transaction where software, services and goods are
provided, one could argue that the implied warranty extends
only to the portion of the transaction that constitutes a contract
for sale. However, if the ordinary purpose for which IOT devices
are used includes the facilitation of interconnectivity and the
exchange of data between devices, networks, individuals, and
companies, and software and services are needed to achieve this
goal, this warranty is breached where a company collecting data
314. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (“[A]
warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their
sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.”); see also id.
§ 2-314(3) (“[O]ther implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage
of trade.”). Additional objections to the application of implied warranties to
software agreements include the claim that software programs are “diverse
collections of ideas that cannot reasonably be compared to one another.” Robert
W. Gomulkiewicz, The Implied Warranty of Merchantability in Software
Contracts: A Warranty No One Dares to Give and How to Change That, 16 J.
Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 393, 399 (1998). However, as Professor
Gomulkiewicz notes, the implied warranty of merchantability can be reframed to
apply to software agreements. Id. at 400–02 (describing a proposal for application
of an implied warranty of merchantability and quality of a computer program).
315. See, e.g., John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule:
Are Software Resale Limits Lawful? 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 25 (2004) (“It is very
common for a license agreement accompanying the transfer of a software product
to state that the software is ‘licensed’ to the end user, who is invariably referred
to as the ‘licensee’ and never as the ‘purchaser’ of the software.”).
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from an IOT device fails to secure the device and the associated
data.
Many IOT devices lack anti-malware protection and have
either no passwords or weak factory-set passwords, such as
“admin,” “12345,” or “password,” which can easily be guessed by
hackers. 316 IOT security failures may impact not only buyers,
sellers and service providers but also unrelated third parties
who become victims of distributed denial of service attacks
where vulnerable IOT devices are weaponized by hackers.
Once a court determines under the functionality approach
that a transaction is subject to Article 2, the following factors
could be used to assess whether a company has adopted effective
measures to enable a device to be fit for its ordinary purpose:
(a) compliance with federal and state regulation or guidance on
the IOT and data security and privacy issues, and industry wide
initiatives, 317 (b) the adoption and implementation of detailed
cybersecurity plans for dealing with data breaches, (c) the
extent to which the company tests its systems, software
programs, services, and devices for intrusion and weaknesses
316. David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, A New Era of Internet Attacks
Powered by Everyday Devices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/10/23/us/politics/a-new-era-of-internet-attacks-powered-byeveryday-devices.html?_r=1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
317. For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute of
Standards and Technology has recently issued security guidelines and
engineering principles, and an introduction to the concepts of privacy engineering
and risk management. RON ROSS, MICHAEL MCEVILLEY & JANET CARRIER OREN,
SYSTEMS SECURITY ENGINEERING, NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-160 (Nov. 2016),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP. 800-160.pdf; SEAN
BROOKS, MICHAEL GARCIA, NAOMI LEFKOVITZ, SUZANNE LIGHTMAN & ELLEN
NADEAU, AN INTRODUCTION TO PRIVACY ENGINEERING AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN
FEDERAL
SYSTEMS,
NISTR
PUBLICATION
8062
(Jan.
2017),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir /2017/NIST.IR.8062.pdf; see also Data Breach
Insurance Act, H.R. 6032, 114th Cong. (2016) (proposing a bill that would give a
fifteen percent tax credit to companies who purchase data breach insurance
coverage and adopt the National Institute of Standard and Technology’s
voluntary cybersecurity framework). In the financial services industry, states
such as New York have proposed strong measures to force companies to protect
consumer data. See New York State Department of Financial Services, Proposed
Regulation,
23
NYCRR
500
(proposed
Sept.
13,
2016),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/proposed/rp500t.pdf (commenting on the
need to establish certain regulatory minimum standards aimed at combatting
cybersecurity issues in the financial services industry).
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prior to making the product available to the public, (d) whether
the company’s IOT products are accompanied by anti-virus,
anti-spyware and anti-malware software programs, (e) whether
the company undergoes annual reviews and frequent
penetration testing to assess the efficacy of cybersecurity
measures after the product has been placed on the market,
(f) whether the company timely and effectively addresses known
security vulnerabilities, and (g) the extent to which a company
monitors third party vendors or service providers that the
company uses to handle customer data or systems connected to
IOT devices.
Of course, in some instances, it may be unclear whether
security flaws or vulnerabilities are due to the manufacturer’s
actions, an unrelated third party, or the device owner’s failure
to effectively use the security measures offered by the company.
Additionally, since many IOT devices require access to a Wi-Fi
network, internet service providers must play a crucial role in
ensuring network security.
Further, courts should not ignore the impact of security
fatigue—a phenomenon where consumers become “tired of being
overwhelmed by the need to be constantly on alert, tired of all
the measures they are asked to adopt to keep themselves safe,
and tired of trying to understand the ins and outs of online
security . . . which causes a sense of resignation and a loss of
control.” 318 Security fatigue in the IOT setting may affect the
choices and decisions of consumers, and companies should be
primarily responsible for ensuring that IOT devices and all
associated data are secure.
Because IOT devices may become vulnerable over time—
where a manufacturer fails to provide the necessary software
318. Belton Zeigler, The Next Threat to Cybersecurity: Consumer Fatigue,
LAW360 (Nov. 9 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/861219/the-next-threatto-cybersecurity-consumer-fatigue (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). See generally Brian Stanton, Mary F.
Theofanos, Sandra Prettyman & Susanne Furman, Security Fatigue, IT
PROFESSIONALS, Sept.–Oct. 2016, at 26 https://www.computer.org/csdl/
mags/it/2016/05/mit2016050026-abs.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (discussing a
study conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which
describes the impact of security fatigue on the online security experience of
consumers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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upgrades or fails to protect consumer data after delivery of the
goods—the condition of the goods both prior to and after delivery
should be considered. 319 The official comments to UCC section 2314 suggest that there is room in the code for the evolution of
new standards for assessing the implied warranty of
merchantability. 320
Consumers may also suffer intangible harms from privacy
intrusions. One such example includes an FTC settlement order
involving Aarons, a rent-to-own company, that permitted its
franchisees to install software on rent-to-own products that
allowed them to secretly track consumer locations and capture
images of customer login information for financial and social
media websites. 321 The sale of a device that contains software
that is surreptitiously installed to obtain information about
consumers and access to a customer’s user accounts is not fit for
its ordinary purpose and should give rise to a breach of implied
warranty claim.

319. See, e.g., Powers v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 79 P.3d 154, 157 (Idaho 2003)
(noting that breach of the warranty of merchantability focuses on whether the
goods are unmerchantable at the time of delivery); see also Timothy Davis, UCC
Breach of Warranty and Contract Claims: Clarifying the Distinction, 61 BAYLOR
L. REV. 783, 787 n.13 (2009) (contending that the warranty of merchantability
does not extend to the future performance of delivered goods).
320. See U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 6 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002)
(stating that “[t]he language used is ‘must be at least such as . . . ,’ and the
intention is to leave open other possible attributes of merchantability”). Scholars
have also proposed reforming tort law to address cybercrime. See, e.g., Michael L.
Rustad & Thomas H. Keonig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of CyberCrime,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1558–59 (2005) (calling for the creation of a new
tort of negligent enablement of cybercrime because of the failure of contract law
to provide adequate protection to consumers).
321. See Allison Grande, FTC Heads Face Senate Security Over Data Security
Approach, LAW360 (Sept. 27, 2016, 9:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/844593/ftc-heads-face-senate-scrutiny-over-data-security-approach (last
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (reporting on criticisms of the FTC’s decision to continue
pressing data security claims in cases where no consumers suffer no financial
harm) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Linda Chiem, FTC OKs
Settlement In Rent-To-Own Co. Software Spying Row, LAW360 (Mar. 11, 2014,
6:55 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/517559/ftc-oks-settlement-in-rent-toown-co-software-spying-row (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (summarizing the Aaron’s
settlement agreement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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If, at the time of contracting, the manufacturer or retailer
knows of the particular purpose for which a buyer intends to use
an IOT device—for instance, where the buyer has expressed a
need for a secure device and related services and software that
will be used for a specific objective—and the buyer relies on the
seller’s expertise and knowledge in selecting the device, the
buyer should have a cause of action for breach of the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose if the IOT device is
insecure. 322
Where an owner of an IOT device must use software and
services provided in connection with the device for the device to
operate and the owner has no choice but to permit the device to
collect information about the owner, there is a reasonable
expectation that the party collecting and storing this data will
implement effective security measures to ensure that the device
and data is secure. If the manufacturer or retailer fails to
provide adequate security measures, owners of IOT devices
should have a cause of action for breach of implied warranties
under Article 2. 323 Companies should not be permitted to
322. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (“Where
the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill
or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or
modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit
for such purpose.”).
323. Even where Article 2 applies to a transaction, thereby implicating the
implied warranties, consumers may still face additional hurdles in data breach
lawsuits. Under Article 2, for example, a buyer’s failure to give notice to a seller
may be fatal to the buyer’s cause of action. Id. § 2-607(3)(a). Additionally, in some
cases, the standing requirement poses a significant problem for consumers in data
breach lawsuits. See, e.g., In re Zappos.com Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 949 (D. Nev.
2015). For example, the district court in In re Zappos.com Inc. found that the
plaintiffs lacked standing in a data breach lawsuit because “[e]ven if Plaintiffs’
risk of identity theft and fraud was substantial and immediate in 2012, the
passage of time without a single report from Plaintiffs that they in fact suffered
the harm they fear must mean something.” Id. at 958. However, in Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Group, the Seventh Circuit stated that the risk of identity theft
or credit card fraud was immediate and real, reasoning that “Neiman Marcus
customers should not have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or creditcard fraud in order to give the class standing . . . .” 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir.
2015); see also Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (finding that
to have standing a party much show, among other things, injury in fact that is
concrete and particularized but concrete is not necessarily synonymous with
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disclaim their liability for third party hacking and data leaks in
the consumer context.
One could contend that, given the frequency with which
hacking occurs, purchasers of IOT devices cannot have a
reasonable expectation that the devices can be made completely
free from vulnerabilities. 324 In fact, the privacy policy of at least
one IOT company specifically provides for the express
assumption of risk by the consumer where there is an
unauthorized access of their data by third parties. 325 Nest’s
EULA provides that the company makes no warranties as to the
security of the software provided in connection with their

tangible injuries and “intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete”); Galaria
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 15-3386, 2016 WL 4728027 (6th Cir. Sept. 12,
2016) (applying Spokeo to hold that victims of data breach can sue without having
to wait for their information to be misused). Moreover, even in distributed denial
of service attacks, consumers may be able to meet standing requirements if they
can prove that their device failed to work properly, such as where service or
connection was interrupted because of the hack. Allison Grande, Web Attack Piles
Onto Internet of Things Security Concerns, Law360 (Oct. 25, 2016),
https://www.law 360.com/articles/854891/web-attack-piles-onto-internetof-things-security-concerns (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Additionally, where a company that
manufactures an IOT medical device obtains FDA approval for the manufacture
and sale of the device, and continues to comply with FDA standards, consumer
claims—including breach of implied warranty claims—related to a defect in such
a device may be prohibited. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 329–30
(2008) (holding that the preemption clause of the Medical Device Amendments
Act bars common law claims challenging the safety or effectiveness of a medical
device marketed in a form that received premarket approval from the Federal
Drug Administration and stating that “state requirements are pre-empted under
the [Medical Device Amendments Act] only to the extent that they are ‘different
from, or in addition to’ requirements imposed by federal law”).
324. See Scenario ONE The New Normal, CTR. FOR LONG-TERM
CYBERSECURITY, U.C. BERKELEY, https://cltc.berkeley.edu/scenario/scenario-one/
(last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (noting that by 2020 internet users may assume that
their data will be stolen and broadcast) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
325. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, FILIP (last updated Oct. 2014),
http://www.myfilip.com/privacy-policy/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (“[W]e cannot
guarantee that your personal information will be completely free from
unauthorized access by third parties, such when transferred over or through
systems not within our exclusive control. Your use of our FiLIP Service
demonstrates your assumption of this risk.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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products. 326 However, courts should be wary of permitting IOT
companies to escape liability in data breach lawsuits based on
this rationale. The data generated by IOT devices is extremely
valuable to companies. 327 As I have argued elsewhere, data
analytics using aggregated IOT data sets can forecast the
behaviors and preferences of customers. 328 IOT companies must
bear some responsibility for device failures and security issues,
particularly where consumer data becomes vulnerable.
Some jurisdictions prohibit the disclaimer of implied
warranties in consumer transactions. 329 To the extent that a
state does not prohibit the disclaimer of implied warranties in
contracts involving merchants and consumers, these warranties
should be made non-disclaimable in such transactions. 330 These
changes may be necessary given the various ways in which the
impact of the Warranty Act has been limited as discussed in Part
III.B above. Additionally, in at least one state that attempts to
326. See End User License Agreement, NEST, supra note 78 (“NEST LABS
PROVIDES THE PRODUCT SOFTWARE ‘AS-IS’ AND DISCLAIMS ALL
WARRANTIES AND CONDITIONS, WHETHER EXPRESS, IMPLIED, OR
STATUTORY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE, QUIET ENJOYMENT,
ACCURACY, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT OF THIRD-PARTY RIGHTS.”).
327. See Maverick, supra note 280 (providing statistics on the rapid growth of
IOT data).
328. See Elvy, supra note 19, at 896 (“Amazon has obtained a patent for an
anticipatory package shipping system that will analyze and predict consumer
habits and deliver goods to consumers before they place an order.”).
329. See 3A LAWRENCE ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316:71 (3d
ed. 2014) (listing jurisdictions).
330. The 2003 proposed revisions to Article 2 would have imposed specific
language requirements for the disclaimer of implied warranties in consumer
transactions, but under these revisions, such warranties would remain
disclaimable as long as the disclosure requirements were satisfied. Revised
Article 2, U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003)
(Withdrawn 2011). In addition to state prohibitions on the disclaimer of implied
warranties, a few states have taken an aggressive approach to addressing the
warranty problem in consumer transactions by adopting separate statutes aimed
at preventing consumers from being deceived into believing that contract
provisions, which violate their rights under existing law are valid. See The New
Jersey Truth-In-Consumer Contract Warranty and Notice Act N.J.S.A. 56:12–15.
The act establishes liability when a contract or other writing by a “seller, lessor,
creditor, lender or bailee” violates a consumer’s established legal right. Id.; see
also Sponsors’ Statement, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 1660 (May 1, 1980).
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limit the effect of warranty disclaimers, this restriction appears
to extend only to personal injury claims. 331 As such, in the IOT
context, the adoption of new disclaimer prohibitions should
extend to both personal injury as well as economic loss. In some
states, privity requirements may also need to be relaxed to avoid
vertical privity issues and to permit actions by third party nonpurchasers who suffer economic rather than personal injury
harms. 332 The application of Article 2 to IOT transactions and
the widespread prohibition of implied warranty disclaimers in
consumer transactions could encourage IOT companies to keep
IOT devices and consumer data secure.
One could contend that prohibiting warranty disclaimers
and extending implied warranties to the software and services
aspect of a hybrid consumer transaction could lead to increased
costs for companies which are ultimately passed on to
consumers. Of course, this assumes to some extent that the use
of warranty disclaimers in form contracts lowers costs for
companies and that these companies pass along these savings to
consumers. As with other form contract provisions, such as
arbitration clauses, it is likely challenging to assess whether the
inclusion of warranty disclaimers in consumer contracts
generate cost savings for companies. Further, as the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau has noted “whether such savings,
to the extent they exist, are passed along to consumers is even
more difficult to establish or disprove.” 333 Concerns about
331. See ALA. CODE §§ 7-2-316(5), 7-2-719(4) (1975) (stating that nothing in
the disclaimer provisions “shall be construed so as to limit or exclude the seller’s
liability for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods”).
332. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (describing
three alternatives for third party beneficiaries of warranties); see also JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-3, 546 (2017)
(noting that third party non-purchasers must allege personal injury in most
states under Article 2).
333. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 10.3, at 15 (2015) [hereinafter “CFPB Study”]; see
also CFPB Study Finds That Arbitration Agreements Limit Relief for Consumers,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/cfpb-study-finds-that-arbitration-agreements-limit-relief-forconsumers/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (noting that based on the CFPB study
“there is no evidence of arbitration clauses leading to lower prices for consumers”)
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potential increases in the price of IOT products due to the
imposition of non-disclaimable implied warranties in hybrid IOT
consumer contracts are likely outweighed by the serious privacy
and cybersecurity issues posed by the IOT, and the growing need
to encourage companies to effectively address security issues.
Another possible objection to the application of implied
warranties under a functionality approach is that a private
ordering solution will effectively protect consumers. For
example, companies in various industries, including businesses
in the retail, health and financial services sectors, have initiated
bug bounty programs that pay up to $200,000 and provide other
benefits for information on security weaknesses. 334 These
programs are intended to encourage security researchers to
inform companies of security vulnerabilities. 335 Since 2013,
there has been a large increase in the number of companies that
have adopted these programs. 336 Despite the adoption of such a
program, a company may obtain information about security
vulnerabilities but may not always effectively act to remedy the
issue or disclose the problem to customers. Such programs are
also not designed to compensate consumers for harms suffered
as a result of security flaws. Additionally, companies continue
to disclaim implied warranties and may exclude from express
warranties software and services needed to operate IOT devices.
Article 2’s role in data breach suits becomes increasingly
important in light of the potential limitations of tort law. For
example, in a data breach case, the Third Circuit held that the
plaintiffs’ negligence claims were barred under the economic
loss doctrine, which provides that “no cause of action exists for
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
334. See Kim Perretti, You Don’t Need A Data Breach To Face Regulatory
Scrutiny, LAW360 (Sept. 26, 2016, 9:29 AM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/842172/you-don-t-need-a-data-breach-to-face-regulatory-scrutiny
(last
visited Mar. 5, 2017) (commenting on the increase in regulatory and litigations
actions based on identified security vulnerabilities, rather than breaches) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
335. See id. (“Bug bounty programs (also referred to as vulnerability
disclosure programs) provide incentives, such as cash, airline miles or just
recognition to security researchers who report vulnerabilities to companies.”).
336. See id. (reporting that the number of companies with these programs has
tripled since 2013).
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negligence that results solely in economic damages
unaccompanied by physical or property damage.” 337 Courts in
Pennsylvania, Georgia, Illinois and Massachusetts have all
dismissed data breach suits under the economic loss doctrine. 338
In In re Sony Gaming, a consumer data breach lawsuit, the
court held that the economic loss doctrine barred the plaintiffs
from recovering economic damages, including the cost “to
purchase credit monitoring services,” “loss of use and value of
Sony Online Services,” “loss of use and value of Third Party
Services,” and “a diminution in value of Plaintiffs’ Consoles.” 339
To the extent that the economic loss doctrine applies, consumers
may be prohibited from recovering purely economic losses under
a negligence theory. 340 This highlights the importance of the
application of Article 2 to IOT transactions.
337. Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 176 (3d Cir.
2008) (internal citations omitted). In applying the economic loss doctrine the court
stated “to allow a cause of action for negligent cause of purely economic loss would
be to open the door to every person or business to bring a cause of action. Such an
outstanding burden is clearly inappropriate and a danger to our economic
system.” Id.
338. See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d
1154, 1171 (D. Minn. 2014) (stating that courts in California, Georgia, Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have faced data-breach claims and all of these
courts dismissed the negligence claims based on the economic loss rule); see also
In re TJX Companies Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489, 498–99 (1st Cir.
2009), as amended on reh’g in part (May 5, 2009) (holding that a bank’s negligence
claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine); Sovereign Bank, 533 F.3d at
175–78 (same); Willingham v. Glob. Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01157-RWS,
2013 WL 440702, at *17–19 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013) (dismissing negligence claims
with prejudice based on the economic loss doctrine); In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad
Litig., 830 F. Supp. 2d 518, 528–30 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting that the economic loss
rule can apply to product liability and negligence claims).
339. See In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 965 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that an everyday consumer
transaction does not constitute a special relationships for purposes of the
economic loss doctrine).
340. In some jurisdictions the impact of the economic loss doctrine can be
avoided where there is special relationship between the parties or where unique
circumstances justify risk allocation. See, e.g., Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc.,
215 P.3d 505, 512 (Idaho 2009) (noting that a special relationship only exists in
two situations: “(1) ‘where a professional or quasi-professional performs personal
services [;]’ and (2) ‘where an entity holds itself out to the public as having
expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing, knowingly induces
reliance on its performance of that function.’” (citations omitted)). Factors to
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C. Article 9’s Embedded Approach
Given that software is now routinely embedded within
devices, Article 9’s definition of goods may be particularly useful
for the IOT era. First, Article 9 of the UCC excludes from the
definition of goods software embedded in goods that consist
“solely of the medium in which the program is embedded.” 341 If
the software is offered on a computer disc or where the software
retains its independent status apart from the goods, it would
likely be viewed as a general intangible rather than a good
under Article 9. 342 As discussed in Part III above, IOT devices
are distinct from software transactions involving computer
discs. 343
Second, under Article 9, goods are defined to include
software embedded within goods and supporting information
provided in connection with the transaction if the software is
customarily considered as part of the goods or if by owning the
goods a person acquires a right to use the software associated
with the goods. 344 Under this definition, an IOT device could be
considered a good even though the device contains embedded
software because a purchaser of an IOT device obtains a license
consider in evaluating the parties’ relationship include:
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered,
(5) the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct and (6) the
policy of preventing future harm.
J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979).
341. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
342. See id. § 9-102(a)(76) (defining software as a computer program and any
supporting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the
program and noting that the term does not include a computer program that is
included in the definition of goods); id. at § 9-102(a)(42) (describing software as a
general intangible); see also Steven O. Weise, The Financing of Intellectual
Property Under Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1077, 1086 (1999)
(contending that where software retains its independent status it is a general
intangible); Towle supra note 227, at 547 (contending that Article 9 expressly
provides that a computer program does not become a good simply because it is
embedded on a tangible medium—a disc).
343. Supra Part III.
344. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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to use the services and software provided by the manufacturer
or retailer.
Ultimately, buyers of IOT devices expect software to be
provided in connection with devices to allow the devices to
perform the functions advertised by manufacturers, thereby
making it customary that such programs are considered to be
part of IOT devices. 345 Thus, “[w]hen software is embedded and
marketed as an integral part of goods, many, if not most, people
would consider the software to be part of the goods.” 346
Article 9’s definition of goods is similar to the approach
contained in previous proposed revisions to Article 2 (“Revised
Article 2”), which were ultimately withdrawn. 347 The definition
of goods in Revised Article 2 excluded information not associated
with goods but it is unclear whether the term information was
intended to cover software. 348 The comments to Revised Article
2 suggested that the sale of “smart goods,” such as an automobile
with computer programs, is likely a transaction in goods subject
345. See Brenan, supra note 203, at 427 (contending that Article 9’s free
transferability policy severely restricts a licensor’s ability to prevent a forced
dedication of its royalties to a licensee’s secured lender and the Copyright Act has
long addressed “embedded software” in express statutory provisions and so there
was no need for Article 9 to do so).
346. SOFTWARE PRINCIPLES, supra note 44, § 1–2; see also American Bar
Association Working Group Report on the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, AM. BAR. ASSOC. (Jan. 31, 2002), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/ucita.authcheckdam.pdf (suggesting that
how goods containing software are marketed should be a relevant factor in
assessing whether UCITA should govern a transaction). The functionality
approach described in this Article considers not only the role of software in goods
but also the novel IOT services described herein that are equally as central to the
functionality of IOT devices. However, not all intellectual property scholars agree
with this line of reasoning. See Brenan, supra note 345 and accompanying text
(suggesting that a computer program could never be associated with the goods in
such a manner that it customarily is considered part of the goods because the
Copyright Act specifically negates this result).
347. Revised Article 2, U.C.C. § 2-103(k), cmt. 7 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2003) (Withdrawn 2011).
348. Id. Additionally, states such as Oklahoma have specifically excluded
information from Article 2’s definition of goods. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2105(1) cmt. 1 (West 2016); see also Kim, The Software Licensing Dilemma, supra
note 198, at 1110 (contending that Revised Article 2 “added ‘information’ to the
list of things that are not considered goods, but left unresolved whether software
products are ‘goods’ or ‘information.’” (emphasis added)).
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to Article 2. 349 However, Revised Article 2 stopped short of
definitively bringing such transactions within the scope of
Article 2.
The proposed comments did not address whether software
subsequently downloaded to smart products would be excluded
from Article 2 because the transfer was electronic. 350 The
comments to Revised Article 2 went on to provide that whether
a hybrid transaction involving the sale of goods and software
falls within the scope of Article 2 is a determination to be made
by courts and a court may elect to apply Article 2 to only the
goods aspect of the transaction. 351 This approach would have
authorized courts to use the predominant purpose and
gravamen of the claim tests to assess hybrid transactions, both
of which are problematic.
In contrast, Article 9 more succinctly addresses the issue of
computer programs embedded within goods. 352 Article 9’s
application to security interests involving goods embedded with
software does not prevent the application of federal intellectual
property law, but Article 9 will not apply to the extent that it is
preempted. In fact, the revisions to amended Article 9 were
intended to “facilitate the ability of a licensee of intellectual
property to obtain financing secured by its rights under the
license.” 353
Currently, Article 2 relies only on Article 9’s definition of
consumer goods. 354 The definition of goods would be more
349. Id.
350. Braucher, supra note 34, at 269–71. The proposed comments did suggest
that the transaction in the Specht case would not be subject to Article 2. See
generally Revised Article 2, U.C.C. § 2-103(k), cmt. 7 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2003) (Withdrawn 2011).
351. See generally Revised Article 2, U.C.C. § 2-103(k), cmt. 7 (AM. LAW INST.
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003) (Withdrawn 2011).
352. See 1-11 SOFTWARE LICENSING § 11.05 (2015) (noting that chips
controlling a car’s brakes, security system, heating system’s thermostat, or a Mr.
Coffee machine are classified as goods under Article 9). See generally Edwin E.
Smith, A Summary of the Provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
Asset Based Financing 2009, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL LAW AND
PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 707 (2009).
353. Weise, supra note 342, at 1092.
354. U.C.C. § 2-103(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001) (noting that
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consistent across the different articles of the UCC if Article 2
were amended to adopt the provisions of Article 9’s definition of
goods that relate to computer programs.
One potential drawback to the Article 9 approach is that it
fails to account for the different services that may be provided
by companies in connection with IOT devices. This could then
mean that Article 2 would apply to the sale of the device with
the embedded software and perhaps the associated software
updates, but not necessarily the services provided by the
company that also allows the device to operate. A functionality
test or a products approach to Article 2 may be advantageous for
this reason.
Another objection to using the Article 9 embedded approach
is that eventually it may become difficult to differentiate
between embedded and non-embedded software. 355 Such an
attempted differentiation also begs the question of whether preembedded software should be viewed differently from
downloaded software, both of which may be necessary for IOT
devices to continue to operate as intended.
Manufacturers may eventually design IOT devices in such a
manner that the software is no longer within the device but
provided through other means, such as cloud computing, for
example. Thus, even if Article 2 were amended to clearly extend
to goods embedded with software, goods associated with
non-embedded software may not fall within Article 2’s scope. Of
course, Article 9’s definition of goods includes not only a
computer program embedded in goods but also “supporting
information provided in connection with a transaction relating
to the program.” 356 To the extent that software updates and
non-embedded software could be viewed as “supporting
information,” one could contend that these types of software—
that are related to goods—and computer programs—embedded
within the goods—fall within the definition of goods.

the definition of consumer goods in section 9-102 applies to Article 2).
355. Braucher, supra note 34, at 250; see also Philp Koopman & Cem Kaner,
The Problem of Embedded Software in UCITA and Drafts of Revised Article 2, 43
U.C.C. BULL., rel. 1 & 2 (2001).
356. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(44) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
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Under the functionality approach, the medium through
which the software is provided does not determine whether
Article 2 would apply to a transaction. Under the functionality
test, where the software is central to the operations of the
device, Article 2 could apply to the transaction regardless of
whether the software is pre-loaded onto the device, subsequently
downloaded onto the device or provided via cloud computing.
D. Exclusionary Approach
Another potential solution to the issues posed by hybrid
transactions is to amend Article 2 to exclude software embedded
in goods and all transactions involving a combination of goods,
software and services. 357 Such an approach would certainly
improve predictability and clarity in this area because parties
would know prior to contracting that, where goods are
associated with software or services and are provided together,
the transaction would not be subject to Article 2. Justification
for this approach could be found in section 2-102, which provides
that Article 2 applies to transactions in goods. 358
One could argue that Article 2 was intended to cover
transactions in goods only and not transactions involving
software or services. To some extent the predominant purpose
and the gravamen of the claim tests reflect this point because
under these tests, Article 2 applies only where the main purpose
of the transaction is for the sale of goods or where a party’s claim
is related to the goods that were provided. These tests focus on
separating the goods aspect of the transaction from the services
or software portion of the agreement.
357. In proposed amendments to Article 2, information was excluded from the
definition of goods and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
States Law had proposed but later failed to approve a definition of information
which would have defined information as “data, text, images, sounds, mask
works, computer programs, software, databases, or the like, including collections
and compilations. The term includes computer information.” National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proposed Amendments to Uniform
Commercial Code Article 2—Sales (2002), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared
/docs/ucc2and2a/ucc2_am02.pdf; see also Lee Kissman, Comment, Revised Article
2 and Mixed Goods/Information Transactions: Implications for Courts, 44 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 561, 566 (2004).
358. U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).

170

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2017)

However, this is an overly restrictive interpretation of
section 2-102. IOT devices satisfy the definition of goods because
they are movable items and, in this manner, are arguably no
different from the goods of the pre-information era, with the
exception of the software and services accompanying the
devices. Section 2-102 does not provide that Article 2 applies
“only to transactions in goods” or “only to transactions involving
the sale of goods” rather it states that Article 2 applies to
“transactions in goods.” This suggests that Article 2’s scope can
and should extend to all agreements involving goods even where
software and services are involved in the transaction and even
though there may be other provisions of Article 2 which arguably
apply only to contracts for the sale of goods.
Additionally, even though the predominant purpose and the
gravamen of the claim tests attempt to focus on the goods aspect
of a transaction, courts have long recognized that it is possible
for Article 2 to apply to transactions that involve not only goods
but services as well. As such, excluding IOT hybrid transactions
from the scope of Article 2 would contradict the express
language of section 2-102.
A products approach, functionality approach or Article 9
approach to this problem recognizes the potential breadth of
section 2-102. Under these three approaches Article 2 could
possibly apply to transactions involving the sale of goods even
where such a transaction also involves the provision of services
or software. Further, if an exclusionary approach were adopted,
Article 2 breach of implied warranty claims may be rendered
obsolete in data breach and hacking cases involving IOT devices.
V. Conclusion
The IOT is expected to generate “self-sustaining
autonomous systems,” 359 and where necessary, existing legal
frameworks must evolve in the face of this new reality. While
there are certainly areas of Article 2 that can be improved, it
remains the best source of unified state law available to evaluate
IOT transactions. However, given Article 2’s ambiguity on the
359.

Choudhary, supra note 237, at 239.
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issue of hybrid transactions and the fact that it is questionable
whether there will be widespread application of common-law
service warranties, UCITA and the Software Principles, there is
a strong need to increase uniformity and clarity in this area.
IOT transactions involve an intricate provision of connected
hardware, services and software in which software and services
constitute an integral, if not the predominant, part of the
transaction. In the IOT era, the functionality of goods depends
on software and services. As a result, the purchaser’s
relationship with a manufacturer or retailer must continue well
beyond the initial sale of the device. In this way, hybrid IOT
transactions are distinct from the hybrid transactions of old.
The cost of sensors, embedded processors and cloud
computing has decreased dramatically resulting in large
numbers of IOT devices that can be easily manufactured by
companies. 360 As a result, “literally everything will have IOT
technology at some point.” 361 Even if one does not believe that
IOT hybrid transactions will be fundamentally different from
other types of transactions—including software transactions—
the expected proliferation of software-dominated and connected
IOT devices, and the lack of explicit clarity in Article 2 on how
to deal with hybrid transactions, combined with the
well-documented inadequacies of the predominant purpose test
justify calls for the development of new frameworks in this area
or, at the very least, discourse about Article 2’s role in the IOT
setting. Resolving the long-standing ambiguity regarding
Article 2’s applicability to hybrid transactions promotes
uniformity of the “laws of various jurisdictions,” which is a
central and important goal of the UCC. 362
This Article proposed and evaluated four potential solutions
for addressing hybrid IOT transactions with the aim of
improving clarity, simplicity and uniformity. Ultimately, a
functionality approach may be the preferred method for
evaluating IOT hybrid transactions because this test accounts
360. Paul Taylor, How The Internet Of Things Makes Dumb Devices Smart,
FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2016/09/22/how-the-internet-of-thingsmakes-dumb-devices-smart/#38cae0f7726c (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) (describing
advancements in IOT devices) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
361. Id.
362. U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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for the uniqueness of IOT hybrid transactions where a device’s
operations are contingent upon the provision of software and
services.
The functionality solution avoids the time-consuming
process needed to amend the UCC, which would be required for
the implementation of the products approach, the Article 9
embedded approach and the exclusionary approach. Courts
could simply begin applying the functionality test to IOT hybrid
transactions in place of the predominant purpose test. Of course,
amendments may be needed to more effectively prohibit
disclaimers of implied warranties in consumer transactions.
The functionality approach represents a compromise
between the all or nothing approach of the products and
exclusionary solutions, which would either bring the entire
transaction under Article 2’s scope or exclude such transactions
from Article 2 in all cases. Under the functionality test,
transactions involving goods, software and services are subject
to Article 2 only where the services and software are integral to
the device’s operations. In this way, the functionality test
strikes an appropriate balance.
Section 1-103 of the UCC notes that modernization of the
law of commercial transactions is an important policy
underpinning the code and its provisions must be liberally
construed. 363 In keeping with these goals, the IOT will
revolutionize the types of goods that are sold to buyers and the
provisions of the UCC must be generously interpreted to account
for this new era.

363.

Id. § 1-103(a).

